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INTRODUCTION 
This Article shows the limits of the highly ideological U.S. debate 
on consumer bankruptcy and challenges the wisdom of both the 
progressive and law-and-economics bodies of scholarship.  In particular, 
the study employs a descriptive analysis of consumer bankruptcy 
discharge informed by behavioral law-and-economics methodology in 
order to show how bankruptcy shapes debtors’ behaviors.  This Article 
argues that bankruptcy discharge, traditionally regarded in common law 
legal systems as a pro-debtors remedy, in its most liberal extension, 
instead becomes a powerful incentive toward over-indebtedness and 
therefore, a profitable legal device for financial institutions. 
Further, this Article argues that civil law legal systems, which are 
typically considered pro-creditor due to their much stricter approach 
toward consumer debt, present an opposite picture: a much less-indebted 
middle class and a less fertile soil for creditors.  By demonstrating the 
paradoxical effects of the common law and civil law approaches to 
consumer debt, this Article challenges the traditional wisdom according 
to which the civil law tradition—based on the “universal patrimonial 
liability” rule for debtors—is purely a pro-creditor system while the 
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common law tradition—faithful to a liberal notion of bankruptcy 
discharge—is a pro-debtor one. 
This assertion lays the foundation for a new normative analysis of 
bankruptcy discharge that suggests that in order to truly protect debtors, 
contrary to traditional progressive ideas, it is necessary to adopt a less 
paternalistic approach that considers the incentives that bankruptcy 
discharge poses to debtors.  This ex ante perspective, different from the 
one supported by law-and-economics scholarship, arrives at the 
conclusion that in order to ultimately make debtors safer, it is necessary 
to tighten access to bankruptcy discharge and restore the mechanism’s 
original founding principle of protecting only the honest but unfortunate 
debtor, not any over-indebted individual. 
This analysis is organized as follows.  Part I illustrates the recent 
global trends in consumer bankruptcy, particularly, the tendency of civil 
law legal systems to move toward the common law model through the 
liberalization of discharge of consumer debt.  Part II describes the 
historical evolution of bankruptcy discharge in both England and the 
United States, and points out the fact that the civil law tradition has 
taken a different course of development for debtors’ liability compared 
to the direction followed by common law legal systems.  Part III shows 
how the rationale behind discharge has dramatically changed in 
twentieth-century American bankruptcy law.  Part IV illustrates the U.S. 
debate on the scope of discharge and offers an alternative descriptive 
analysis based on the results of a behavioral law-and-economics 
analysis.  Lastly, Part V proposes a new normative analysis of discharge 
that departs from both the progressive and conservative scholarly 
discourse in the United States. 
I. RECENT TRENDS IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
A.  THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE 
BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE 
In the last three decades, several countries belonging to different 
legal traditions have encouraged the liberalization of consumer 
bankruptcy by introducing the discharge of consumer debt.2  This trend3 
                                                                                                                                         
 2. In general terms, discharge is the legal elimination of a debt through 
bankruptcy proceedings.  After a discharge is granted, a debt is no longer legally 
enforceable against the debtor. See Charles J. Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in 
Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 56, 56 (1990) [hereinafter Tabb, Scope of the Fresh Start].  A useful survey of 
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finds its immediate explanation in the explosion of consumer credit and 
runs opposite to the pattern in the United States, traditionally the most 
liberal country in its attitude toward discharge.  This 
“democratization”—or using more honest terms, “deregulation”—of 
credit has typically been singled out as the reason behind the recent 
global trends in consumer bankruptcy discharge.4 
Particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s, the United States and 
U.K. under the Clinton and Blair administrations, respectively, eased 
access to consumer credit through deregulation.5  In order to maximize 
                                                                                                                                         
debtors’ liability regimes in different legal systems is offered by Rafael Efrat, Global 
Trends in Personal Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 81 passim (2002) [hereinafter 
Efrat, Global Trends]; CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT & BANKRUPTCY – COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 1 passim (Johanna Niemi et al. eds., 2009); see also Iain 
Ramsay, Between Neo-Liberalism and the Social Market: Approaches to Debt 
Adjustment and Consumer Insolvency in the EU, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN 
EUROPE – DIFFERENT PATHS FOR DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 5 passim (Robert Anderson 
et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Ramsay, Between Neo-Liberalism and the Social Market]. 
 3. See discussion infra Part III. 
 4. See infra Part I.B. 
The United States emerged from the war with unparalleled 
prosperity and hardly needed further savings campaigns.  Instead 
politicians, businessmen and labor leaders all promoted consumption 
as the new driver of economic growth.  Rather than democratize 
saving, the American system rapidly democratized credit.  An array 
of federal housing and tax policies enabled Americans to borrow to 
buy homes and products as no other people could.  But from the 
1980s, financial deregulation and new tax legislation spurred the 
growth of credit cards, home equity loans, subprime mortgages and 
predatory lending.  Soaring home prices emboldened the financial 
industry to make housing and consumer loans that many Americans 
could no longer repay.  Still, Americans wondered, why save when it 
is so easy to borrow? Only after housing prices collapsed in 2008 did 
they discover that wealth on paper is not the same as money in the 
bank. 
Sheldon Garon, Why We Spend, Why They Save, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2011, at A35. 
 5. In particular, the U.S. Congress passed the Financial Services Modernization 
Act of 1999, which repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.  The U.K. passed 
the Financial Services (Open-Ended Investment Companies Act) Regulation in 1997 
and the Enterprise Act in 2002.  For more on the strong connection between neo-liberal 
economic theories, the exponential growth of finance, and the deregulation of the 
consumer credit market, see LARRY ELLIOT & DAN ATKINSON, THE GODS THAT FAILED 
– HOW BLIND FAITH IN MARKETS HAS COST US OUR FUTURE 1 passim (2009); DAVID 
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welfare, these two countries strongly embraced the ideas that high 
consumption drives economic growth and that consequently, risk-taking 
and consumer debt must be spurred even among low-income 
borrowers—ideas exemplified by the expansion of subprime lending.6 
                                                                                                                                         
HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEO-LIBERALISM 1 passim (2007); see also Ramsay, 
Between Neo-Liberalism and the Social Market, supra note 2. 
 6. See Iain Ramsay, ‘Wannabe WAGS’ and Credit ‘Binges’: The Construction of 
Overindebtedness in the UK, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT & BANKRUPTCY – 
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 75, 77–78, 84 (Johanna Niemi et al. 
eds., 2009) [hereinafter Ramsay, ‘Wannabe WAGS’ and Credit ‘Binges’].  The spread 
in emerging markets of an economic growth model based on high consumption by 
lower-income classes is shown in the case of Brazil, where between 2000 and 2007 the 
number of credit cards increased from 119 million to 413 million.  See Cláudia Lima-
Marques & Antônio Benjamin, Consumer Overindebtedness in Brazil and the Need for 
the New Consumer Bankruptcy Legislation, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT & 
BANKRUPTCY – COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 55, 57, 60–61 
(Johanna Niemi et al. eds., 2009) (describing the first decade of the 21st century as a “a 
‘credit hangover’ period, a time when these ‘new’ and poorer consumers cannot afford 
to pay their own debts, but they are still in the bank and credit card system as solvent 
clients”). 
Our economy depends on consumer spending.  Our economists take 
inconsistent positions about whether the spending is good or bad.  
They demand that people save more to increase capital investment 
and productivity at the same time they warn that increased 
consumption is essential to economic growth.  In short, they want 
more spending and more savings.  They are apparently too busy to 
explain how to do both of these at the same time, especially when 
incomes are stagnant.  One thing Americans can do on the 
consumption side, despite their stagnant incomes, is to incur more 
debt.  Many people have an enormous economic stake in 
encouraging us to do just that.  No one, it seems, has an interest in 
providing sober reminders about the risks involved.  Adding to these 
general trends is the growth of a whole new segment of the 
consumer credit industry . . . . The new segment is concentrated on 
the very consumers who were feared and avoided by credit granters 
just a few years ago.  They are people at the margins who already 
have high consumer debts in relationship to their incomes.  So called 
subprime lending – that is, lending to people who have spotty credit 
histories or are awash in debt – is the most profitable, and hence the 
most rapidly increasing, segment of consumer lending. 
TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS – AMERICANS IN DEBT 23–24 
(2000).  On the functioning of subprime lending markets, see Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction 
by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2004); Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics 
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This highly suggestive idea, which has collapsed during the 
financial crisis of 2008, has deeply influenced financial policies around 
the globe, triggering a competition among different legal systems to 
introduce consumption-stimulating measures.7  The resultant climate, 
characterized by a shortsighted trust in the ability of consumer credit to 
promote economic growth, is undoubtedly reflected in E.U. regulation 
“on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 
87/102/EEC.”8  This European Directive is strongly inspired by the idea 
that having access to a good deal of information before concluding a 
financial agreement is enough to guarantee “responsible” credit.9  The 
regulation, which focuses on the supply side of the consumer credit 
market while neglecting consumers’ protection, fully relies upon market 
dynamics in order to prevent “bad” credit.10  Several European countries 
                                                                                                                                         
and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1073 
(2009). 
 7. A clear illustration of the influence exercised by the U.S. and U.K. models of 
consumer credit on continental Europe is provided by the Italian doctrinal debate on the 
opportunity to introduce bankruptcy discharge, which is seen by some authors as a tool 
to spur consumption and consumer credit.  In fact, some Italian scholars have argued 
that the low indebtedness of Italian families compared to those in the U.K. is a 
symptom of Italian economic stagnation. See L’INSOLVENZA DEL DEBITORE CIVILE 
DALLA PRIGIONE ALLA LIBERAZIONE, in ANALISI GIURIDICA DELL’ECONOMIA 299 passim 
(Gaetano Presti et al. eds., 2004).  In particular, see Lorenzo Stanghellini, ‘Fresh Start’: 
implicazioni di ‘policy’, in L’INSOLVENZA DEL DEBITORE CIVILE DALLA PRIGIONE ALLA 
LIBERAZIONE 437, 440 n.4 (Gaetano Presti et al. eds., 2004) (arguing that considering 
“the current and expected trend of consumer credit growth, it is not an exaggeration to 
state that Italian economy relies on the expansion of this sector in order to develop.  
This very same conclusion has been reached, with a good deal of realism, by the 
legislators of other countries, as the United Kingdom, which among the reasons of its 
recent reform . . . introduced the need to stimulate consumption, which there as in other 
countries relies for a substantial portion on credit”). 
 8. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DIRECTIVE 2008/48/EC (Apr. 23, 2008); see Ramsay, 
Between Neo-Liberalism and the Social Market, supra note 2, at 6 (“The treatment of 
over-indebtedness is one part of consumer credit regulation policy which straddles 
economic and social policy.  The EU promotes consumer credit as ‘the lubricant of 
economic life’ within the context of a ‘competitive social market economy.’  The 
development of debt adjustment systems and insolvency is part of the constitution of 
this market.  The EU has thus far focused more on creating a competitive credit market 
than addressing its social costs, perhaps reflecting the influence of neo-liberal ideas and 
financial interests in credit policymaking within the EU.”). 
 9. See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DIRECTIVE 87/102/EEC, recitals 24 and 26. 
 10. On the EU Consumer Credit Directive, see Udo Reifner, ‘A Call to Arms’ – 
For Regulation of Consumer Lending, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT & BANKRUPTCY – 
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have also examined the bankruptcy discharge of consumer debt with 
respect to the demand side of the consumer credit market to further 
encourage the use of credit.11 
                                                                                                                                         
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 105, 114–15 (Johanna Niemi et al. 
eds., 2009) (“For the EU regulator, only the market can define what is good and detect 
what consumers need. . . . The mere fact that people are overindebted proves that the 
credit was ‘bad’ for them.”).  The approach of European institutions to consumer credit 
can be cited as a tangible demonstration of the recent European trend of distancing 
itself from its original, more paternalistic approach aimed at protecting consumers’ 
interests in areas such as product safety and quality.  More recently, European 
institutions seem more sensitive to guaranteeing the economic interest of consumers 
(i.e., purchasing goods at the lowest price).  On the abdication of the European model 
and the dominance of the North American model, see VICTORIA DE GRAZIA, 
IRRESISTIBLE EMPIRE – AMERICA’S ADVANCE THROUGH TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPE 
1 passim (2005). 
Germany and France, I will argue, remain far more oriented toward 
producer and distributor interests . . . than the United States, even in 
this high age of consumerism. . . .  Continental law is indeed putting 
a growing emphasis on the consumer protection interest, developing 
many paternalistic guarantees of the safety and quality of goods and 
services.  But the consumer economic interest is making slower 
headway.  The result, as I will try to show, is that contemporary 
continental law can leave many producer protections on the books. 
See James Q. Whitman, Consumerism v. Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 
117 YALE L.J. 340, 348 (2007).  The author later clarifies his terminology: 
Let us begin with the ambiguities of “consumer interests.”  On the 
one hand, when we speak of ‘the interest of consumers,’ we may be 
speaking of consumer economic interests, i.e., of the interest of 
consumers in purchasing goods and services at the lowest possible 
price, in having access to the widest variety of goods and services, in 
having easy access to credit, in being able to shop at maximally 
convenient hours and locations, and the like.  On the other hand, 
when we speak of ‘protecting the interest of consumers,’ we may be 
speaking of consumer protection and safety legislation, that is, 
legislation on such matters as products liability, the purity of food 
and drugs, nondeceptive advertising, and the like. 
Id. at 366–67. 
 11. See infra Part V.B. 
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B.  OVER-INDEBTEDNESS AND BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE 
In keeping the idea that favoring consumption through extensive 
access to credit is socially desirable, over the last several decades, 
several civil law countries have begun to view the common law 
approach to consumer bankruptcy as a viable tool to spur consumption, 
questioning the efficiency of their regimes in governing individuals’ 
liability toward creditors.12 
Traditionally in civil law legal systems, an individual is liable for 
his obligations with all his assets.13  In particular, the default rule 
governing relations between debtors and creditors is that all of a person’s 
property (his entire present and future patrimony) is available for seizure 
and sale to satisfy the claims of creditors (so-called “universal patrimonial 
liability”).14  Furthermore, in the civil law tradition consumer debts are 
typically excluded from bankruptcy law.  Therefore, discharge is not 
granted to individuals whose debts are not related to an entrepreneurial 
activity.15 
The universal patrimonial liability regime governing consumer 
debt, which stands in clear contrast to the consumer bankruptcy 
discharge regimes of common law systems, has recently been viewed as 
one of the reasons for low indebtedness, low consumption, and 
consequently, following the rationale of the so-called “consumer 
                                                                                                                                         
 12. See infra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, Divergences and Convergences of Common Law 
and Civil Law Traditions on Asset Partitioning: A Functional Analysis, 12 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 517, 525 (2010). 
 14. See Rojas Elgueta, supra note 13, at 525.  The principle of “universal 
patrimonial liability” was first introduced in modern codifications by Article 2092 of 
the French Code Napoléon of 1804 (“Quiconque s’est obligé personnellement, est tenu 
de remplir son engagement sur tous ses biens mobiliers et immobiliers, présents et à 
venir.”).  The same principle can be found nowadays in many civil codes, including the 
Italian Civil Code and Civil Code of Québec.  See Art. 2740 Codice civile [C.c.] (It.) 
(“The debtor is responsible for his obligations with all his present and future assets.”); 
CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 2644 (Can.) (“The property of a debtor is 
charged with the performance of his obligations and is the common pledge of creditors.”); 
CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 2645 (Can.) (“Any person under a 
personal obligation charges, for its performance, all his property, movable and 
immovable, present and future . . . .”). 
 15. See, e.g., ITALIAN BANKRUPTCY LAW, Royal Decree No. 267 (Mar. 16, 1942) 
where at art. 1, ¶ 1 it is stated: “Are subject to the provisions of bankruptcy law . . . 
entrepreneurs that carry on a commercial activity. . . .” 
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economy,”16 slow economic growth among European countries.17  In 
fact, the severe regime toward debtors’ liability typical of the civil law 
tradition has been blamed for making individuals more risk-averse and 
less willing to incur debt than they would under existing bankruptcy law 
in common law systems.18  Based on this assumption, several 
countries—even those with a strong culture of saving19—have thought it 
                                                                                                                                         
 16. For a criticism of economic theories relying on consumption and indebtedness 
as tools to achieve economic growth see CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH ROGOFF, 
THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY passim (2009).  For a 
critical sociological examination of the “consumer economy,” see ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, 
CONSUMING LIFE 1 passim (2007). 
 17. See Stanghellini, supra note 7, at 443. 
 18. A typical example of this rhetoric can be found in the Italian doctrinal debate 
on the opportunity to introduce consumer discharge. See Stanghellini, supra note 7, at 
443: 
On the other hand, a strong pressure and/or an afflictive regime 
imposed on an insolvent debtor can persuade a person evaluating 
whether to take on debt not to do it and this is capable of resulting in 
a contraction of consumptions . . . and in a reduction of propensity to 
take risks, together with a loss for society both in terms of a 
reduction of social welfare and a reduction of entrepreneurial 
initiatives . . . . The prospect of a perpetual liability . . . is capable of 
producing a loss for society considering that an insolvent debtor will 
refrain from engaging in profitable activities and, at the same time, 
creditors will not gain any benefit from this abstention. 
See also Riccardo Brogi, Bilancio e indebitamento delle famiglie italiane, 
L’INSOLVENZA DEL DEBITORE CIVILE DALLA PRIGIONE ALLA LIBERAZIONE 265, 280 
(Gaetano Presti et al. eds., 2004).  According to this author, regulating consumer 
discharge is a fundamental measure necessary to fill the gap that separates Italy from 
countries like the U.K. which the author considers, at least until the financial crisis of 
2008, more efficient. 
 19. According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2007 Italian household debt 
relative to GDP was 48% as compared to 99.5% of U.S. households and 110.2% of 
U.K. households. See Pietro Reichlin, I vizi e le virtù (nascoste) del debito, IL SOLE 24 
ORE (Feb. 21, 2010), available at http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/SoleOnLine4/ 
dossier/Italia/2009/commenti-sole-24-ore/21-febbraio-2010/vizi-virtu-nscoste-
debito_PRN.shtml.  Furthermore, in 2008, the Italian debt to income ratio was 45.3%, 
BANCA D’ITALIA, SUPPLEMENTO AL BOLLETTINO STATISTICO – I BILANCI DELLE 
FAMIGLIE ITALIANE NEL (2008), available at http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/ 
indcamp/bilfait/boll_stat/suppl_08_10_corr.pdf; and increased to 66% in 2011, BANCA 
D’ITALIA, BOLLETTINO ECONOMICO NUMERO 67 GENNAIO (2012), available at 
http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/bollec/2012/bolleco67/bollec67/boleco_
67.pdf.  In the U.K., however, it was 152% in 2007, SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB ET AL., 
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suitable to reform this liability regime and introduce discharge of 
consumer debt to boost debt propensity and, consequently, 
consumption.20 
Undoubtedly, as American scholars have unanimously pointed, 
there is a strict correlation between consumer bankruptcy, household 
over-indebtedness and consumer credit.21  Nevertheless, the U.S. debate 
                                                                                                                                         
Disclosure as an Imperfect Means for Addressing Overindebtedness: An Empirical 
Assessment of Competitive Approaches, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT & BANKRUPTCY – 
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 153, 156 (Johanna Niemi et al. eds., 
2009); and 155.4 % in 2011, US, UK Households Start Reducing Their Debt Burdens, 
FIRSTPOST, (Sept. 24, 2011), http://www.firstpost.com/world/us-uk-households-start-
reducing-their-debt-burdens-91146.html.  According to Garon, “[o]ver the past three 
decades, Germany, France, Austria and Belgium have maintained household saving 
rates between 10 and 13 percent, and rates in Sweden recently soared to 13 percent.  By 
contrast, saving rates in the United States dropped to nearly zero by 2005; they rose 
above 5 percent after the 2008 crisis but have recently fallen below 4 percent.”  See 
Garon, supra note 4, at A35. 
 20. With regard to continental Europe, a very significant development has been the 
introduction of consumer discharge in France and Germany, which had traditionally 
adopted a “universal patrimonial liability” regime.  In France, consumer bankruptcy 
was first introduced by Law No. 89-1010 of December 31, 1989 regarding “la 
prévention et au règlement des difficultés liées au surendettement des particuliers et des 
familles.”  This law was subsequently repealed by Decree No. 2004-180 of February 
24, 2004 (recently amended by Law No. 2010-737 of July 1 2010 and by Decree No. 
2010-1304 of October 29, 2010) regarding “la procédure de traitement des situations de 
surendettement des particuliers et modifiant le titre III du livre III du code de la 
consummation.”  The latter decree has been included in the Code de la Consommation 
(Titre III of the Livre III).  In Germany, consumer discharge (Insolvenzordnung) was 
regulated by Gesetz, October 5, 1994, BGBl.I S. 2866, recently amended by Gesetz, 
December 9, 2010, BGBl I S. 1885.  Greece adopted its first consumer and small 
business bankruptcy law in 2010 (Law No. 3869/2010).  In Italy, consumer bankruptcy 
was regulated for the first time by Law No. 3 of January 27, 2012, which was later 
amended by Law Decree No. 179 of October 18, 2012 (later amended by Law No. 221 
of December 17, 2012). 
 21. In the United States between 1979, the year following the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code of 1978, and 2004, consumer bankruptcy filings rose from 250,000 to 
1.5 million. See Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy 
Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1464 (2005).  From 1945 to 1970, consumer bankruptcy 
filings climbed from 11,051 to 178,202. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION – 
A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 136–37 (2001) [hereinafter SKEEL, 
DEBT’S DOMINION].  This increase has been explained as a direct consequence of the 
expansion of consumer credit, which was particularly encouraged by the introduction of 
credit cards in the sixties.  In fact, in the same period, consumer debt expanded from 
$30 billion in 1945 to $569 billion in 1974. See Vern Countryman, Improvident Credit 
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on consumer bankruptcy has become polarized22 with strong ideological 
positions on either side regarding the cause-and-effect relationship of 
consumer bankruptcy and consumer credit.23  Pro-debtor scholars (the 
“progressive bankruptcy scholarship”)24 maintain that creditors and their 
predatory techniques must be blamed for household over-indebtedness 
and the consequential rise in consumer bankruptcy filings while pro-
creditor scholars (the “conservative bankruptcy scholarship”)25 insist 
that the ease in obtaining discharge makes individuals opportunistically 
willing to incur more debt, which in turn, causes lenders to ration credit 
and demand more collateral.26  The debtor-oriented approach reasons 
that ensuring easy access to discharge is a necessary remedy for over-
indebted U.S. consumers.  On the other hand, the creditor-oriented 
approach strongly supports the idea of making bankruptcy laws stricter 
in order to limit debtors’ strategic behavior and make consumer credit 
more efficient.27  It is worth noticing how these two schools of thought 
adopt opposite perspectives.  While the former appeals to an ex post 
reasoning, viewing discharge as a last-resort remedy to over-
indebtedness, the latter takes an ex ante approach, arguing that the 
restriction of discharge would establish the correct incentives for 
debtors, thereby making credit more available and cheaper.28 
                                                                                                                                         
Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborning, 27 ME. L. REV. 1, 1 (1975).  The correlation 
between bankruptcy and consumer debt is also stressed in RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING 
AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS AROUND THE 
WORLD 60–72 (2006); Robert M. Lawless, The Paradox of Consumer Credit, 2007 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 347, 348 (2007); Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 6, at 1373–74, 
1413; and SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 129.  The financial literature agrees upon a 
correlation between credit card usage and consumer bankruptcy. See Ian Domowitz & 
Robert Sartain, Determinants of the Consumer Bankruptcy Decision, 54 J. FIN. 403 
(1999).  On the expansion of consumer credit in the United States, see LENDOL CALDER, 
FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 1 
passim (2001). 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. The ideological character of the consumer bankruptcy debate in the United 
States is described by SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 187–211. 
 24. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Vern Countryman and the Path of Progressive (and 
Populist) Bankruptcy Scholarship, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2000) [hereinafter 
Skeel, Progressive Bankruptcy Scholarship]. 
 25. See SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 200 (referring to this 
scholarship as “law-and-economics scholarship”). 
 26. On the different theories of pro-debtor and pro-creditor scholars, see infra Part 
IV. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
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The recent global trends in personal bankruptcy policy—in 
particular, the European tendency to introduce discharge of consumer 
debt—represents a unique opportunity to have a second and deeper look 
at bankruptcy discharge to assess the effectiveness of the American 
debate on this topic.  In fact, as it has been shown, the idea behind the 
liberalization of discharge practices in Europe is to make individuals 
more willing to incur debt, and therefore expand the consumer credit 
supply.  Unlike the American progressive bankruptcy scholarship, the 
European approach does not treat discharge as a remedy for consumers’ 
over-indebtedness, but instead adopts an ex ante perspective, regarding 
it as a way to encourage consumers to take on more debt.  Meanwhile, it 
parts ways with the American conservative bankruptcy scholarship in 
contending that discharge will provoke the expansion, not rationing, of 
credit. 
II. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE 
In order to solve this puzzle as to whether discharge is a last resort 
to protect debtors or a powerful tool to encourage risk-taking behavior, 
one must understand the original rationale for bankruptcy discharge by 
exploring its historical evolution. 
A.  THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 
1. England:  The Emergence of Bankruptcy Discharge 
In the thirteenth century, England passed a statute to introduce the 
measure of imprisonment for debtors in default.29  In order to promote 
commerce, which was highly dependent on credit, such coercive 
imprisonment was considered to be a fundamental tool to protect 
                                                                                                                                         
 29. In particular, imprisonment for debt was introduced by the Statute of 
Marlbridge of 1267. See Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and its 
Relation to the Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL. HIST. 153, 154 
(1982); See also Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1919).  In early Roman law, the Law of the Twelve Tables 
provided for the physical punishment of an insolvent debtor and also the possibility of 
apportioning the debtor’s body to creditors. See Rafael Efrat, The Evolution of 
Bankruptcy Stigma, 7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 364, 373 (2006) [hereinafter Efrat, 
Bankruptcy Stigma]. 
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creditors’ interests.30  Mere default was sufficient to detain the debtor.  
The law did not distinguish between defaulting debtors who were 
solvent and therefore perceived as fraudulent, and those who were 
honest but unfortunate, insolvent debtors.31 
The first English bankruptcy laws of the sixteenth century were 
specifically conceived to protect those creditors who were willing to 
finance the risky adventures of the emerging English middle class: 
merchants and traders engaging in mercantile activities.32  In fact, the 
earliest bankruptcy proceedings were confined to merchants and traders 
and not debtors whose obligations originated from different activities.  
The proceedings were conceived not to relieve debtors but for the 
exclusive purpose of protecting creditors from fraudulent debtor conduct 
and payment evasion.33 
Only in the early 1700s did the idea of incentivizing the most 
dynamic sector of English society (traders and merchants) find its way 
into the political agenda.34  Among the incentives aimed at increasing 
entrepreneurship and risk-taking was bankruptcy discharge.35  Since the 
possibility of incorporating an organization was not generally admitted 
as a way of limiting debtors’ liability, discharge was used as an 
alternative legal device to achieve a functionally equivalent outcome.36 
Two fundamental elements characterized the original rationale 
behind discharge in the eighteenth century.  First, a basic distinction was 
                                                                                                                                         
 30. Cohen, supra note 29, at 154–55. 
 31. Id. at 157; see also MICHAEL QUILTER, The Quality of Mercy - The Merchant of 
Venice in the Context of the Contemporary Debt and Bankruptcy Law of England, 6 
INSOLV. L. J. 43, 45 (1998). 
 32. For an overview of the historical evolution of English bankruptcy law, see Ian 
P. H. Duffy, English Bankrupts, 1571-1861, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283 (1980). 
 33. Both the Bankruptcy Act of 1542 and that of 1570 (An Act Touching Orders 
for Bankrupts) were enacted with the specific purpose of curbing debtors’ ability to 
defraud creditors. See Cohen, supra note 29, at 155–56. 
 34. Charles J. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. 
BANKR. L. J. 325, 335 (1991) [hereinafter Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the 
Bankruptcy Discharge]. 
 35. See id.  
 36. Id.; see also Tabb, Scope of the Fresh Start, supra note 2, at 100; CHARLES J. 
TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 68 (1997) [hereinafter TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY]; 
Thomas J. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 
1400 (1985); Cohen, supra note 29, at 160–62.  Discharge is viewed as a means to spur 
commercial enterprise. See Efrat, Global Trends, supra note 2, at 81 (“Since 
entrepreneurs generally face a higher risk of financial failure as compared to wage 
earners, a broad fresh start policy in bankruptcy provides a necessary cushion to 
accommodate their increased financial vulnerability.”). 
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made between fraudulent traders and merchants and honest traders and 
merchants who were victims of unavoidable misfortunes related to their 
highly risky activities.37  Therefore, bankruptcy discharge was suggested 
as a means of relief for the latter group that experienced financial 
distress because of exogenous events.38 
Second, only traders and merchants were included within the scope 
of bankruptcy laws.39  Since discharge was available only through a 
bankruptcy proceeding, non-trading debtors were unable to benefit from 
it.40  Any debt that was not assumed for a commercial enterprise was 
perceived as unreasonable and morally unacceptable.41 
                                                                                                                                         
 37. Duffy, supra note 32, at 286–87. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at 
334–35. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id.  The reasons lying behind the restriction of bankruptcy laws to traders 
and merchants are explained in exemplary fashion by William Blackstone: 
A bankrupt was before defined ‘a trader who secretes himself, or 
does certain other acts, tending to defraud his creditors.’  He was 
formerly considered merely in the light of a criminal or offender; . . . 
But at present the laws of bankruptcy are considered as laws 
calculated for the benefit of trade, and founded on the principles of 
humanity as well as justice; and to that end they confer some 
privileges, not only on the creditors, but also on the bankrupt or 
debtor himself.  The laws of England . . . are cautious of encouraging 
prodigality and extravagance by this indulgence to debtors; and 
therefore they allow the benefit of the laws of bankruptcy to none 
but actual traders; since that set of men are, generally speaking, the 
only persons liable to accidental losses, and to an inability of paying 
their debts, without any fault of their own.  If persons in other 
situations of life run in debt without the power of payment, they 
must take the consequences of their own indiscretion, even though 
they meet with sudden accidents that may reduce their fortunes: for 
the law holds it to be an unjustifiable practice, for any person but a 
trader to encumber himself with debts of any considerable value.  If 
a gentleman, or one in a liberal profession, at the time of contracting 
his debts, has a sufficient fund to pay them, the delay of payment is a 
species of dishonesty, and a temporary injustice to his creditor: and 
if, at such time, he has no sufficient fund, the dishonesty and 
injustice is the greater.  He cannot therefore murmur, if he suffers the 
punishment which he has voluntarily drawn upon himself.  But in 
mercantile transactions the case is far otherwise.  Trade cannot be 
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In this cultural and economic context at the outset of the eighteenth 
century, the proposal to introduce bankruptcy discharge for those 
unfortunate but honest and cooperative traders and merchants was first 
accepted and regulated by the Act of 1705.42  Meanwhile, imprisonment 
remained the rule for non-trading debtors in default until 1869.43 
The Act of 1705 represents a fundamental stage in the evolution of 
bankruptcy law.44  This law was framed to distinguish among different 
categories of debtors, taking into consideration both the human 
vicissitudes lying behind the financial distress in question (fraudulent as 
opposed to honest but unfortunate debtors) and the activity responsible 
for the incurred debt (traders and merchants as opposed to non-trading 
debtors).45  While sixteenth and seventeenth century bankruptcy law was 
conceived as a purely pro-creditor device and reserved only for traders 
and merchants who were thought to be more inclined to defraud 
creditors, in the eighteenth century, bankruptcy law started appreciating, 
                                                                                                                                         
carried on without mutual credit on both sides: the contracting of 
debts is therefore here not only justifiable but necessary.  And if by 
accidental calamities, as by loss of a ship in a tempest, the failure of 
brother traders, or by the nonpayment of persons out of trade, a 
merchant or trader becomes incapable of discharging his own debts, 
it is his misfortune and not his fault. 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 473–75 (1765). 
 42. An Act to Prevent Frauds Frequently Committed by Bankrupts (4 & 5 Anne c. 
17) is the name of the Act of 1705 that first introduced the practice of bankruptcy 
discharge. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 
34, at 333–34 (pointing out the fact that discharge was not automatic, but was 
considered a judicial act within the discretion of the bankruptcy commissioners). 
 43. Cohen, supra note 29, at 155–57, 162–64; see also PETER J. COLEMAN, 
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND 
BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900, 7, n.8 (1974) (“If a man be taken in execution, and lie in 
prison for debt, neither the plaintiff, at whose suit he is arrested, nor the sheriff who 
took him, is bound to find him meat, drink, or clothes; but he must live on his own, or 
on the charity of others; and if no man will relieve him, let him die in the name of God, 
says the law; and so say I.”) (quoting Judge Robert Hyde). 
 44. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 
34, at 333. 
 45. See id. at 338; Levinthal, supra note 29, at 18–19 (regarding traders and 
merchants, “[t]he discharge was the result of the gradual realization of the fact that in 
many cases the bankruptcy might be properly an object of pity”); BLACKSTONE, supra 
note 41, at  471–72 (pointing out, in a perspective that would be defined today as in 
accordance with law and economics, the benefit to society of eliminating the prior debts 
of a trader so that he “by the assistance of his allowance and his own industry, may 
become a useful member of the commonwealth”). 
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through the benefit of bankruptcy discharge, the social value of those 
groups who were willing to challenge the uncertainties of mercantile 
activity in order to increase both their own welfare and the social 
welfare.46  This shift in the collective perception of traders and 
merchants triggered a process of transformation in bankruptcy law from 
a purely creditor-oriented remedy to a pro-debtor one that emphasized 
risk-taking, debtors’ cooperation during the bankruptcy proceeding, and 
restoring debtors to a productive economic cycle. 
In sum, honesty and being the unfortunate victim of an exogenous 
event are the two fundamental elements that, in the eighteenth century, 
justified the introduction of discharge and the loosening of creditors’ 
influence in managing the financial distress of their debtors.47 
2.  The United States:  From the Origins Through the Nineteenth 
Century Pro-Debtor Approach 
Notwithstanding the U.S. Constitution of 1787, which includes a 
bankruptcy clause that allows Congress to legislate at a federal level,48 
in the late eighteenth century, this federal power was not exercised.49  
Yet, several states passed laws to grant debtors some sort of relief.50 
The first federal bankruptcy law was the Bankruptcy Act of 1800.  
It followed its English precedents and was mainly aimed at protecting 
creditors rather than implementing a broad discharge policy.51  As with 
the English bankruptcy laws, only merchants were included within the 
scope of the proceeding.52  In addition, this proceeding was involuntary 
in the sense that only creditors could file the petition, and discharge was 
not automatic because the approval of the bankruptcy commissioners 
                                                                                                                                         
 46. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at 
338. 
 47. Blackstone recognizes the importance of honesty by stating that “the law seems 
to be pretty rigid and severe against the bankrupt; but, in case he proves honest, it 
makes him full amend for all this rigour and severity.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 41, at 
482 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 49. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at 
344. 
 50. Id. at 345. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 346. 
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and creditors was needed.53  Notwithstanding its pro-creditor approach, 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was repealed only three years later, unable 
to hold out against the accusation that it favored mercantile interests 
over agricultural ones,54 enabled creditors to receive only a small 
dividend of their credit, and incited fraudulent behavior on the part of 
debtors who were granted discharge.55 
The U.S. Congress then enacted new federal bankruptcy legislation, 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.  Unlike the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, which 
did not depart from its English precedents, the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 
represented a significant step in the historical evolution of bankruptcy 
law, particularly with regard to tensions between the interests of 
creditors and debtors.56  This was so because the severe financial crisis 
of 1837 led to reduced creditor control and the introduction of two major 
innovations.  First, the traditional restriction that allowed only 
merchants to access the bankruptcy proceeding was repealed, enabling 
“all persons whatsoever . . . owing debts” to obtain discharge.57  
Furthermore, “voluntary bankruptcy” appeared for the first time, 
whereby non-merchant debtors were allowed to file a petition for 
bankruptcy in order to obtain discharge, subject to creditors’ approval.58 
The new voluntary bankruptcy proceeding, together with the 
possibility for every debtor to file a petition for discharge, dramatically 
                                                                                                                                         
 53. Id.  On the involuntary character of the early bankruptcy laws, see ELIZABETH 
WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, 
AND PROBLEMS 107 (2006).  It is worth noting that the first voluntary bankruptcy 
proceeding (where also debtors were allowed to file the petition) was the United States 
Bankruptcy Law of 1841. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy 
Discharge, supra note 34, at 349–50. 
 54. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at 
348.  The criticism of discharge as a device favoring the mercantile class must be read 
within the broader tensions among mercantile interests represented by the Federalist 
Alexander Hamilton, and agricultural interests represented by the Republican Tomas 
Jefferson. See SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 3, 26. 
 55. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at 
348. 
 56. Id. at 353. 
 57. See Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 4 Stat. 444 (1841); Tabb, The Historical 
Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at 350.  In England, the 
bankruptcy proceeding became available to all persons, including non-trading debtors 
in 1861. See 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 134, §§ 69, 86 (Eng.). 
 58. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at 
349–50.  The voluntary character of bankruptcy was introduced in England three years 
later. See 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 96, § 41 (Eng.). 
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shifted the equilibrium of bankruptcy law toward favoring debtors.59  
Yet, notwithstanding the new legislation’s changing of fundamental 
aspects, the original rationale of discharge—to protect only the honest 
but unfortunate debtor—was preserved because debtors who committed 
fraudulent acts were ineligible.60 
In 1898, following the repeal of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 in 
1842 and the adoption of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 (repealed in 
1878),61 the U.S. enacted a new national bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898.62  Since then, a federal bankruptcy law has always been in 
existence.63  In the 1898 law, both the extension of eligibility to all 
debtors and the voluntary character of bankruptcy proceeding (available 
to any debtor except corporations) were confirmed.64  In addition, 
discharge—and therefore, a pro-debtor policy—was strengthened thanks 
to the repeal of two requirements: creditors’ consent to the granting of 
the discharge and the payment of a minimum dividend to creditors.65 
Thus, the main goal of bankruptcy law was no longer to protect 
creditors from the abusive behavior of the mercantile class, but rather to 
allow debtors suffering from business misfortunes to once again become 
                                                                                                                                         
 59. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 
34, at 349–50. 
 60. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 5 Stat. 440 (1841). 
 61. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 14 Stat. 517 (1867). 
 62. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 30 Stat. 544 (1898). 
 63. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at 
362. 
 64. Id. at 363. 
 65. Id. at 364.  “No check on discharges other than the statutory limitations 
remained.  This innovation marked as much as anything else the arrival of the ‘modern’ 
American pro-debtor discharge policy.” Id. (“The reform in the United States thus was 
more radical than the 1883 English reform, in which control of the discharge simply 
had been shifted from creditors to the court.  Surprisingly, this major change in basic 
policy occurred with little fanfare or debate.”); see also SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, 
supra note 21, at 38–39 (“Unlike creditor organizations, farmers and other rural 
constituencies did not send memorials to Congress or develop specific legislative 
proposals.  Yet bankruptcy was an extraordinarily prominent issue, and lawmakers from 
farm states actively promoted the ideological views of their rural constituents.  
Ideological entrepreneurs such as Representative Bailey of Texas, who spearheaded the 
campaign for a voluntary-only bankruptcy bill in the mid-1890s, and Senator Stewart of 
Nevada, provided a public face for the prodebtor perspective. . . .  By the 1890s, 
populist lawmakers were the standard bearers for the prodebtor perspective, and the 
debates that led to the 1898 act were full of their exchanges with proponents of a 
federal bankruptcy law.”). 
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a useful member of society.66  Accordingly, discharge—first introduced 
to encourage debtors’ cooperation in satisfying creditors’ interests67—
had entirely become a means to protect debtors.68  This radical shift 
within the common law tradition from a pro-creditor to pro-debtor 
system was justified by the growing acceptance that freeing debtors 
from their burdensome debts and repositioning them to become 
productive again would improve economic efficiency.69 
Yet, the new widespread possibility for merchants to protect their 
personal assets (“limited liability”) through the creation of a new legal 
entity made discharge less appealing for commercial activities and 
placed non-trading debtors (those not engaged in a commercial activity) 
at the center stage of the bankruptcy proceeding.70  In fact, discharge 
was—just as it is today—capable of achieving for individuals the same 
legal effect that was achieved through the formation of a new legal 
entity in commercial activities: limiting the debtor’s liability toward his 
creditors.71 
                                                                                                                                         
 66. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“One of the primary 
purposes of the bankruptcy legislation is to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of 
oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh, free from the obligations and 
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes . . . to give to the honest but 
unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort.”).  
See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law – A Comparison of 
the Recent Bankruptcy Acts of Italy and the United States, 31 MINN. L. REV. 401, 406 
(1947); see also SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 43; Zywicki, supra note 
21, at 1471. 
 67. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 68. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 
34, at 364–65. 
 69. See TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY, supra note 36, at 94–96. 
 70. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 
34, at 363 (“With the increased availability of the corporate form to limit liability for 
entrepreneurs, discharge in bankruptcy now was principally important only for non-
merchants individuals.”); see also Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start” Policy in 
Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 49, 65 (1986) (showing how in the first half of the twentieth century the typical 
bankrupt shifted from merchant to wage earner).  On the historical evolution of 
organizational forms in the common law tradition, see Henry Hansmann, Reinier 
Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335 
(2006). 
 71. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & 
THOMAS J. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 34 (2d ed.  
1990). 
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Notwithstanding the further strengthening of debtor interests in the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the original rationale for discharge (the 
protection of the honest but unfortunate debtor)72 was, as with the 
Bankruptcy Act 1841,73 reaffirmed in this legislation. 
If the debtor has acted dishonestly by committing certain acts 
forbidden in the bill he will not be discharged; if he has acted 
honestly he will be.  The granting of a discharge is justified by a 
wise public policy.  The granting or withholding of it is dependent 
upon the honesty of the man, not upon the value of his estate.74 
Yet, unlike English bankruptcy law, where discharge was submitted 
to strict judicial discretion,75 the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 made 
discharge more or less automatic, repealing nearly every judicial check 
on discharge aside from the statutory limitations.76  The Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898, therefore, marked the start of a gradual departure of U.S. 
bankruptcy law from its original intuition, which was to forgive only 
those debtors that were victims of exogenous misfortunes.  It was only 
until the twentieth century that bankruptcy discharge underwent a more 
radical ideological transformation: from a safety net for the honest but 
unfortunate debtor to providing a safe harbor for any over-indebted 
person.77 
B.  THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: A PRO-CREDITOR APPROACH 
In the nineteenth century, the civil law and common law traditions 
parted ways regarding the treatment of non-trading debtors’ liability 
toward creditors.  Until 1841 in the United States and 1861 in England,78 
only traders and merchants were eligible for bankruptcy discharge while 
non-trading debtors were forced into coercive imprisonment until they 
                                                                                                                                         
 72. See Riesenfeld, supra note 66, at 406. 
 73. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 74. H.R. Rep. No. 55-65, at 43 (1897). 
 75. See The Bankruptcy Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict., c. 52, § 18(6) (Eng.); see also 
SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 90; Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the 
Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at 363–64. 
 76. See SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 90; Tabb, The Historical 
Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 34, at 363–64. 
 77. See infra Part III.A. 
 78. See Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, supra note 
34, at 334–35 n.57 and accompanying text. 
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could fully repay their debts.79  Yet, the common law of the mid-
nineteenth century, by making all debtors eligible for discharge, 
radically amended the regime for non-trading debtors. 
Meanwhile, during the first half of the 1800s, several civil law 
countries—particularly those influenced by the Napoleon Code of 
1804—also had legal regimes that excluded non-trading debtors from 
bankruptcy laws and therefore, from discharge.  Furthermore, these 
countries regulated debtor liability on the premise that all of the debtor’s 
property was charged with the performance of the debtor’s obligations.  
Accordingly, debtor property was the common pledge of creditors, a 
principle known as “universal patrimonial liability.”80 
The historical evolution of the concept of patrimony helps to 
explain this approach.81  An anthropocentric vision arose out of the 
philosophy borne by the Enlightenment and Romantic movements 
whereby assets or property were conceived as the external manifestation 
of an individual and thus, a tangible expression of the human 
personality.82  The notion of such an indissoluble bond between the 
individual and his patrimony shifted from a philosophical doctrine to a 
legal one during the first half of the nineteenth century.83  “Since human 
attributes were indivisible and intangible, the patrimony was also 
considered indivisible and intangible.”84  Therefore, all of a debtor’s 
property was conceived as the common pledge of creditors, leading to 
the idea of universal patrimonial liability.85  Although civil law scholars 
began to question the singleness and indivisibility of patrimony doctrine 
in the early twentieth century, the fundamental dogma remained that 
                                                                                                                                         
 79. See id.; see also Cohen, supra note 29, at 157–59 (noting that in the 
seventeenth century, England introduced insolvency proceedings which aimed to 
exempt from imprisonment those debtors that were not trying to defraud their creditors 
but were simply insolvent). 
 80. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 81. See Rojas Elgueta, supra note 13, at 527–30. 
 82. See id. at 527 & n.40. 
 83. See id. (internal citations omitted).  “This shift is normally ascribed to a French 
[legal] handbook written by a German scholar, K.S. Zachariae, and subsequently 
updated and augmented by two French scholars, Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, Cours 
de Droit Civil Français, d’Après l’Ouvrage de M. C.S. Zacharie (1856-1858).” Id. at 
527 n.41; see Charles Aubry & Charles Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Français, d’Après 
l’Ouvrage de M. C.S. Zacharie (1856-1858), available at http://gallica.bnf.fr/ 
ark:/12148/bpt6k5846820d/f8.image. 
 84. See Rojas Elgueta, supra note 13, at 527. 
 85. See id. at 525, 527, 529–30. 
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only a numerus clausus of circumstances provided by law could limit a 
debtor’s liability.86 
Thus, when the common law tradition was introducing bankruptcy 
discharge for non-trading debtors,87 the civil law tradition was codifying 
the universal patrimonial liability principle.88  The shift in the common 
law tradition from creditors’ dominion—evident in the practice of 
imprisonment for debts—to a pro-debtor system characterized by a 
broader scope of bankruptcy discharge was the result of an economics-
based premise, according to which it is considered more efficient to 
readmit debtors into a productive economic cycle.89  On the other hand, 
the universal patrimonial liability rule typified by the civil law tradition 
was shaped around doctrinal and dogmatic debates on the nature of 
patrimony.90  The different historical courses of the common law and 
civil law traditions with regard to non-trading debtors’ liability explain 
the conventional wisdom according to which common law’s liberal 
bankruptcy discharge policy makes it a pro-debtor system, while civil 
law’s universal patrimonial liability rule makes it a pro-creditor one.91 
                                                                                                                                         
 86. A clear example of this approach can be found in Article 2645 of the Civil 
Code of Québec: “Any person under a personal obligation charges, for its performance, 
all his property, movable and immovable, present and future, except property . . . which 
is the object of a division of patrimony permitted by law.” CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC, S.Q. 
1991, c. 64, art. 2645 (Can.).  An identical principle is stated in Article 2740 Italian 
Civil Code: “The debtor is responsible for his obligations with all his present and future 
assets.  Limitations of liability are not allowed except in the circumstances provided by 
law.” Art. 2740 Codice civile [C.c.] (It.). 
 87. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 88. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 89. See supra notes 45, 64, and 70 and accompanying text. 
 90. One could argue that bankruptcy discharge is not technically an exception to 
the universal patrimonial liability rule, since it eliminates the debt itself instead of 
limiting the assets that are charged with the performance of the debt.  Nevertheless, it is 
apparent that discharge and universal patrimonial liability represent two opposite 
policies governing debtor-creditor relations.  As has been noticed in the Italian doctrine, 
“Notwithstanding our legal tradition provides that the debtor is responsible for his 
obligations with all his present and future assets (Art. 2740 C. Civ.), in principle, 
there’s nothing to prevent that that tradition, in light of other requirements in case 
considered nowadays prevailing, could be changed.” See Stanghellini, supra note 7, at 
438. 
 91. Among the many authors on the favorable treatment that debtors receive in the 
U.S. system, see SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 1 (“What is clear, 
however, is that U.S. bankruptcy law is far more sympathetic to debtors than are the 
laws of other nations.”).  The favor creditoris in the Italian legal system is emphasized, 
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III. BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND THE 
MOST RECENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 
A. FROM A REMEDY FOR THE HONEST BUT UNFORTUNATE DEBTOR TO A 
SAFE HARBOR FOR THE OVER-INDEBTED DEBTOR 
Before verifying whether the respective labels of “pro-debtor” and 
“pro-creditor” for common and civil law regimes are compatible with a 
new descriptive analysis conducted through the lens of the behavioral 
law-and-economics methodology, it is worth emphasizing the trends that 
characterize discharge in the United States over the last fifty years. 
As highlighted in Part I.B of this Article, in the past few decades, 
continental European countries generally trended toward the adoption of 
bankruptcy discharge and the inclusion of consumers within the scope of 
bankruptcy laws.92  In contrast, in the United States—traditionally the 
most liberal country in terms of access to discharge—the past decades 
have been marked by a heated debate over the question of whether to 
limit the scope of discharge. 
Starting in the 1960s, the consumer credit industry strongly invoked 
the adoption of regulations to restrict discharge.93  In particular, financial 
institutions lobbied for Congress to adopt the so-called “means test,” a 
provision that would prevent a debtor from obtaining immediate 
discharge through the liquidation of the debtor’s assets and instead force 
that debtor to go through a program of debt adjustment upon being able 
to repay at least some of the debts.94  Despite creditors’ aggressive 
efforts, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, whose findings 
shaped the Bankruptcy Code of 1978,95 rejected the means test and 
adopted a debtor-oriented approach. 
An especially notable innovation is the Commission’s proposal to 
repeal the provision in the Chapter 13 proceedings that denied discharge 
for any debt based upon a fraudulent financial statement (the “fraud 
exception”).96  The elimination of this fraud exception from the 
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and the resulting Chapter 13 “super 
discharge,” one that includes debt based on a fraudulent statement, 
                                                                                                                                         
among others, by ENRICO MOSCATI, LA DISCIPLINA GENERALE DELLE OBBLIGAZIONI – 
CORSO DI DIRITTO CIVILE 32 (2012). 
 92. See supra Part I.B. 
 93. See SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 154. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. at 139. 
 96. See id. at 154–55. 
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reveals the enormous divide between the original rationale of the policy 
(protecting the honest but unfortunate debtor) and the modern version, 
which also applies to, at least in some circumstances,97 the dishonest 
debtor. 
By the twentieth century, the original prerequisite for obtaining 
discharge—that an honest debtor was the victim of an exogenous, 
misfortunate event that caused the financial distress—was no longer 
required.98  In this much more basic model, over-indebtedness was the 
only prerequisite for discharge, regardless of the reasons for the 
financial distress and the honesty of the debtor.99  The gradual 
affirmation of debtors’ interests has culminated in a radical new reading 
of the expression “honest but unfortunate,” which now extends the 
concept of “misfortune” to include all debtors who are unable to repay a 
debt, even when the debt originated as the result of a bad financial 
judgment, imprudence, or sometimes, a fraudulent act.100 
                                                                                                                                         
 97. Section 1328(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, in its original version 
preceding BAPCPA (see infra note 104 and accompanying text), did not exempt from 
discharge debt obtained through false pretenses, false representation or actual fraud, 
missing a specific reference to § 523(a)(2)(A) where exceptions to discharge are 
regulated. See also infra note 107. 
 98. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 99. The radical shift in the bankruptcy discharge rationale is exemplified by the 
statement made before the U.S. Congress by Ellen Broadman, representative of the 
Consumers Union, during the hearings held in 1984 for the reform of the Bankruptcy 
Code of 1978: “The proposal is totally at odds with the philosophy underlying the 
bankruptcy law of allowing individuals who are overwhelmed by crushing debt 
obligations to start a new, fresh life without debt burden.” SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, 
supra note 21, at 193–94.  The deep transformation of the prerequisites for bankruptcy 
discharge is also apparent when comparing Broadman’s words with an opinion 
delivered by an English judge in 1810: “[r]elief is to be extended to those who are both 
honest and unfortunate.  Honesty alone will not be a title, if the debtor has come to his 
ruin by his own imprudence, without misfortune.” Brown’s Case, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 158, 
159–60 (La. 1810). 
 100. This approach is clearly expressed by Douglas G. Baird, Discharge, Waiver, 
and the Behavioral Undercurrents of Debtor-Creditor Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 17, 25 
(2006) (“Every debtor in dire financial straits is ‘unfortunate.’  You are eligible for a 
discharge even if your financial difficulties arise from bad judgment or improvidence, 
as long as you are honest.  Honest people are sometimes unable to pay what they owe, 
and when this happens the law should be there to help.  So long as they act in good 
faith, the right to discharge in bankruptcy is available.  Instead of limiting the discharge 
to only some debtors in dire straits, the word ‘unfortunate’ now merely describes their 
condition.”). 
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B.  A CHANGE IN TREND IN THE UNITED STATES CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
Due to the relative neglect of the pro-creditor position in the 
Bankruptcy Code of 1978, the consumer credit industry insisted on the 
need to restrict access to bankruptcy discharge, stressing that bankruptcy 
filings increased by 60% within one year of the law’s passage and had 
constantly increased since.101  In the second half of the 1990s, financial 
institutions submitted a new proposal to Congress that would introduce a 
means test into the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 in order to limit automatic 
discharge under Chapter 7 and instead, have Chapter 13 apply to debtors 
who were capable of paying some portions of their debts.102  Despite the 
efforts of progressive bankruptcy scholars who firmly opposed this 
means test103 on the ground that consumers are best protected through 
broad access to discharge, in 2005, financial institutions won the battle 
with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (“BAPCPA”).104 
According to the scholars who supported the means test, BAPCPA 
forces debtors with incomes above their state median and higher than a 
specified portion of their debts to follow a debt adjustment plan.105  
Ultimately, BAPCPA is designed to end abusive behaviors of those who 
use discharge to strategically plan their finances (so-called the 
“bankruptcy of convenience”).106  Furthermore, the lobbyists also 
                                                                                                                                         
 101. See SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 190. 
 102. Id. at 202. 
 103. According to progressive bankruptcy scholars, the elimination of the choice 
between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 is equivalent to the re-establishment of a modern 
form of “involuntary servitude” for individuals and the betrayal of the pro-debtor U.S. 
approach to consumer bankruptcy. Id. at 194–95, 204; see also Vern Countryman, 
Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor – and a Modest Proposal to Return to the 
Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 826–27 (1983) [hereinafter 
Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor]. 
 104. On the advisability of introducing the “means test,” see Edith H. Jones & Todd 
J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 215 (1999). 
 105. The “means test” is regulated by § 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. 11 
U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012). 
 106. See Zywicki, supra note 21, at 1497 (“Second, a debtor’s increased use of 
credit cards preceding bankruptcy may also reflect strategic behavior taken in 
anticipation of filing bankruptcy.  Credit card debt is unsecured debt that can be 
discharged in bankruptcy.  By contrast, some unsecured debts are not dischargeable in 
bankruptcy, and secured debts, such as home and auto loans, are minimally affected.  
For unsecured credit card debt, by contrast, generally the debtor can retain the property 
purchased with the credit card and discharge the obligation.  Given the choice between 
defaulting on secured or nondischargeable obligations on the one hand versus 
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promised that the reform would not exclude bankruptcy’s prototypical 
“honest and unfortunate debtor” with median or below-median income 
from obtaining discharge.107 
Meanwhile, the progressive camp argued that the real scope of 
BAPCPA did not limit access to Chapter 7 discharge for solvent debtors, 
but rather deferred bankruptcy filing for all debtors notwithstanding 
their income and ability to repay their debts.108  In other words, financial 
institutions did not share the goal of limiting the scope of discharge.  
Instead, they wanted to make filings more complicated in order to delay 
any proceedings so that debtors would continue to make payments to 
creditors, thereby increasing creditors’ revenues.109 
In any case, the reform of 2005 undoubtedly marked a clear shift 
away from the pro-debtor ideological monopoly that had characterized 
U.S. bankruptcy law since the mid-nineteenth century. 
                                                                                                                                         
dischargeable credit card debt on the other, the incentive is to use credit cards to finance 
payment of nondischargeable and secured debt.”); see also Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy 
Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 376–77 (2007) 
(“Proponents spent much less time discussing the economics of the consumer credit 
industry or the business models of those most affected by consumer bankruptcy.  In 
particular, the debates often focused on the concept of needs-based bankruptcy—or the 
concern that the skyrocketing bankruptcy filing rates indicate that consumers are using 
the bankruptcy system for financial planning purposes rather than as a last resort.  The 
catch phrase in the legislative history was the ‘bankruptcy of convenience.’”). 
 107. See Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A. E. 
Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne & Elizabeth Warren, Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An 
Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L. J. 349, 352 (2008).  It is 
worth noting that BAPCPA repealed the superdischarge of Chapter 13 first introduced 
in 1978.  After the reform of 2005, § 1328(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 
includes false pretenses, false representation, and actual fraud among the Chapter 13 
exceptions to discharge. 
 108. See id. at 377–85; see also Mann, supra note 106, at 392–400. 
 109. See Mann, supra note 106, at 384 (“In my view, the most important aspect of 
the new law is not the increased payouts associated with means testing, but the way in 
which the law encourages debtors to defer bankruptcy filings.”).  Id. at 392 (“If those 
card users continue to make payments until shortly before they surrender and file for 
bankruptcy, the delay in filing—lengthening the time in the ‘sweat box’—will increase 
the profits the lenders receive from those accounts, or decrease the losses the lenders 
will face when those customers ultimately file for bankruptcy.”). 
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C.  THE EUROPEAN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY OPPOSITE TREND 
Meanwhile, the European approach, which has departed from its 
traditional pro-creditor approach in the past decades, rejects both the 
American progressive and conservative bankruptcy traditions by 
viewing discharge as a way to not only protect consumers but also to 
encourage them to take on more debt.110  In rejecting these positions,111 
the European trend represents a unique opportunity to reconsider the 
traditional analysis and challenge the common picture of discharge as a 
fundamentally pro-debtor legal device. 
IV. A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE 
In order to give a new descriptive analysis of bankruptcy discharge, 
it is first necessary to understand the core characteristics of discharge 
that both the progressive and conservative bankruptcy traditions 
recognize. 
A.  THE UNDISPUTED ASPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE 
It is commonly accepted that bankruptcy discharge aims to achieve 
three different goals.  One is to allow and encourage debtors, freed from 
their debts, to once again become productive members of society.  The 
underlying premise is that the cost of the discharge is less than the cost 
that society would bear if debtors, without the availability of discharge, 
were excluded from economic activity due to the perpetual obligation to 
repay their debts.112  This theoretical justification for discharge, 
explained in terms of “freedom of opportunity,” has primarily developed 
in the United States.113  According to this deeply rooted theory in 
American culture, incentivizing individual risk-taking—and therefore, 
collectively sharing the risk that some private initiatives will fail—is 
fundamental to maximizing social welfare.114 
                                                                                                                                         
 110. See supra Parts I.A and I.B. 
 111. See supra Part I.B. 
 112. See, e.g., William O. Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41 Y. 
L.J. 329, 340 (1932); see also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); Tabb, 
Scope of the Fresh Start, supra note 2, at 90. 
 113. See Douglas, supra note 112, at 340. 
 114. See id. (“The theory of freedom of opportunity which has prevailed in this 
country has resulted in a minimum of governmental interference in strictly private 
enterprise.  Denial of discharges in bankruptcy has been guarded zealously in the 
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The second goal of discharge is to provide debtors with insolvency 
insurance.115  Third, the device seeks to promote debtor cooperation with 
the bankruptcy trustee and creditors regarding debt collection and asset 
liquidation during bankruptcy proceedings.116 
B.  THE PROGRESSIVE BANKRUPTCY SCHOLARSHIP 
Aside from the aforementioned, uncontroversial aspects of 
bankruptcy discharge, the analysis is highly ideological and held hostage 
by the antithetical viewpoints of the progressive and conservative 
bankruptcy scholarships. 
                                                                                                                                         
interest of hard-pressed debtors who desire a new lease on life.  The fact that this is a 
country with large natural resources has led to the notion that failures can be afforded; 
that experimentation in enterprise should be encouraged; that out of the failures may 
come successes which will result in the promotion and development of our industrial 
and economic potentialities.  That the annual bill which consumers pay for such 
experimentation is large is not denied.  But it is insisted that it is worth the price.”); see 
also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 258 (“In the United States we have opted for 
dynamic economic change even at the cost of economic risk and instability.  We have 
chosen economic opportunity at the risk of economic hardship.  We prefer a world of 
winners and losers.  But a world of winners and losers requires a way to cope with the 
losers.  If they revolt in the streets or withdraw from the economy, the costs of their 
failure are displaced to the winners who cannot enjoy their prosperity in safety.  The 
bankruptcy discharge is an important part of the traditional, market driven American 
approach to risk.  Bankruptcy reduces the pain of loss while it lets the losers get back in 
the game.  As far back as Henry Clay, American decided that collectively we would all 
be better off to cut the losers loose from their old debts so they could try the game 
again.”). 
 115. See Barry Adler, Ben Polak & Alan Schwartz, Regulating Consumer 
Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 592–93 (2000); see also 
Michelle J. White, Abuse or Protection? Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Under 
‘BAPCPA,’ 18-19 ÉCONOMIE PUBLIQUE 1, 2 (2006); Adam Feibelman, Defining the 
Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 
130 (2005). 
 116. Tabb, Scope of the Fresh Start, supra note 2, at 90 (“The debtor cooperation 
theory justifies the discharge as a carrot dangled in front of debtors to induce them to 
cooperate with the trustee and the creditors in the bankruptcy case in the location, 
collection, and liquidation of the debtor’s assets.  If the debtor cooperates, the discharge 
is granted; if not, it is denied.  Debtor compliance arguably benefits creditors by 
increasing the size of the asset pie available for distribution and by decreasing the 
administrative costs necessary to effect that distribution.  In short, creditors essentially 
forego the possibility of post-bankruptcy recovery tomorrow in the hope of reaping 
larger bankruptcy dividends today.”). 
2014] THE PARADOXICAL BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE 321 
Until the reform of 2005, the progressive position predominantly 
shaped U.S. bankruptcy discharge policy.117  Under this approach, 
discharge is functionally equivalent to social insurance by allowing 
debtors to mitigate the detrimental consequences of a negative 
exogenous event.118  In the United States, which typically provides a 
much more limited welfare system than European countries, bankruptcy 
discharge is considered to be a legal device to augment Social Security 
in the absence of other social safety nets.119  Thus, bankruptcy discharge 
is considered to be a fundamental tool to protect the American middle 
class from the risk of exogenous shocks, such as job-related income 
interruptions, sickness, and costs related to marital problems, that could 
transform mere indebtedness into pathological insolvency.120  
Progressive scholars identify the combination of such shocks and 
excessive consumer credit as the primary cause of middle-class over-
                                                                                                                                         
 117. See supra Parts III.A and III.B.  The progressive bankruptcy scholarship, which 
obviously counts numerous scholars among its ranks, is typically identified with the 
works of three authors, belonging to different generations: William Douglas in the 
1930s, Vern Countryman in the 1960s and, since the 1990s, Elizabeth Warren. 
 118. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079, 1100–01 
(1998); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, passim. 
 119. SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 100; see also SULLIVAN ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 257; Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of 
the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom 
to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD., 283, 307 (1995) (“[B]ankruptcy Law is analogous to 
the welfare system: it is social insurance for the nonpoor.”); Jean Braucher, Consumer 
Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start or Treadmill?, 44 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1073 (2004); Jackson, supra note 36, at 1397–98 (“[T]he theory 
must explain why, in the context of a social and economic order premised on individual 
autonomy, the law should make inalienable the right to a fresh start.  In particular, it 
must show why the law should specifically protect individuals against the dangers of 
amassing debts when it provides only a general web of social insurance programs to 
protect them against the financial risks of their other activities.”). 
 120. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 75 (“Our data suggest that job-related 
income interruption is by far the most important cause of severe financial distress for 
middle-class Americans.”); see id. at 141 (“Medical science has flowered beyond the 
wildest dreams of earlier generations, yet sickness and injury remain a major threat to 
the economic health of every middle-class family.  The two components of that threat—
either of which can plunge a family from comfortable circumstances to financial 
collapse in a matter of months—are the spiraling cost of medical care and the loss of 
income because of accident, illness, or disability.”); see id. at 173 (“[B]oth marital 
problems and financial difficulties may arise from the same sources of trouble. Once 
financial and marital problems have developed, they are likely to reinforce each other.  
The interaction is often fatal both to the marriage and to the balance sheet.”). 
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indebtedness.121  Accordingly, they select bankruptcy discharge as an 
appropriate response. 
In an ex post perspective that emphasizes remedies more than 
incentives, progressive scholars treat discharge as a final resort for 
reintroducing over-indebted individuals to a productive economic 
cycle.122  Such a focus on the remedy to excesses on the supply side of 
the consumer credit market omits consideration as to whether 
bankruptcy laws—and in particular, bankruptcy discharge—contribute 
to shaping debtors’ behaviors and their financial choices.  Put 
differently, the ex ante perspective, concerned with the incentives that 
discharge poses on the demand side, is neglected by this body of 
scholarship, and therefore leaves unanswered the question of whether 
bankruptcy discharge contributes to over-indebtedness.123 
C.  THE CONSERVATIVE BANKRUPTCY SCHOLARSHIP 
Conservative bankruptcy scholars, who are apparently more 
sensitive to the interests of the consumer credit industry than of debtors, 
take the opposite stance by arguing that a liberal approach to discharge 
is the basis for severe inefficiencies.124  This pro-creditor approach 
follows the ex ante perspective that typifies law-and-economics analysis 
and assumes that individuals are rational, self-interested actors who are 
                                                                                                                                         
 121. Id. at 23–26. 
 122. Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor, supra note 103, at 817–
18; see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 22 (“As American families have faced 
job losses and medical bills, divorces and home mortgages throughout the past decade, 
bankruptcy has been their safety net . . . consumer debt has lowered many middle-class 
families’ threshold for financial collapse.  High consumer debt loads increase families’ 
vulnerability to every other problem—job, medical, divorce, housing—that befalls 
them.”). 
 123. See Skeel, Progressive Bankruptcy Scholarship, supra note 24, at 1118 (“With 
respect to the third factor, the rise of law and economics, current progressives remain 
just as hostile as Countryman himself.  In personal bankruptcy, this has meant a vigilant 
defense of the fresh start, at times to the exclusion of other perspectives.  Gone is any 
serious suggestion that bankruptcy should be used instrumentally to shape debtors’ 
behavior.  The occasional exceptions to this stance have a distinctly populist flavor.”); 
see also Frank H. Buckley, The Debtor as Victim, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1079 
(2002) (“What is troubling, however, is the implicit assumption that an ex post 
perspective suffices, and that debtors do not react to the incentive structure of the 
bankruptcy regime ex ante when they borrow.”). 
 124. See Zywicki, supra note 21, passim; see also Jones & Zywicki, supra note 104, 
at 240. 
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able to make efficient decisions that maximize their individual wealth 
and in the aggregate, social welfare.125  Accordingly, discharge creates a 
moral hazard because it grants debtors the equivalent of free insolvency 
insurance, thereby incentivizing them to take on more debts and 
strategically employ the fresh start benefit.126  These scholars argue that 
the best response to such rational abuse is to establish stricter lending 
criteria and demand more collateral, ultimately leading to a higher cost 
of credit and its subsequent rationing.127 
                                                                                                                                         
 125. See Richard A. Posner, The Nature of Economic Reasoning, in LAW AND 
ECONOMICS ANTHOLOGY 1 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Thomas S. Ulen eds., 1998); 
see also Robert H. Frank, Departures from Rational Choice: With and Without Regret, 
in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 13 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon 
L. Smith eds., 2005). 
 126. See Zywicki, supra note 21, at 1466 (“On the other hand, the option of 
bankruptcy creates a moral hazard problem and increases the risk associated with 
consumer lending, leading creditors to charge higher interest rates, demand collateral or 
a larger down payment, increase monitoring to prevent default, or increase penalties for 
risky behavior such as late payments.”); id. at 1477 (“Thus, if it is easy to file 
bankruptcy and to discharge debt, individuals will want to borrow more and incur more 
risk than if bankruptcy makes it difficult to discharge debt. Indeed, this is a primary 
purpose for bankruptcy law—to make individuals less risk-averse and willing to incur 
more debt than they would absent a bankruptcy law.”). 
 127. Id. (“Lenders, of course, have opposite incentives and will be more willing to 
provide more credit when bankruptcy laws are strict and less where bankruptcy is 
easy.”); see also Jones & Zywicki, supra note 104, at 248.  Following the idea that the 
bankruptcy system makes credit more expensive one study has argued that, because of 
bankruptcy laws, each American household bears a higher cost of credit equal to $280 
per year. See Kartik B. Athreya, Welfare Implications of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1999, 49 J. MONETARY ECON. 1567, 1583 (2002).  When President George W. Bush 
signed BAPCPA in 2005, echoing conservative bankruptcy scholars, he stated: “when 
bankruptcy is less common, credit can be extended to more people at better rates.” 
Michael Simkovic, The Effect of BAPCPA on Credit Card Industry Profits and Prices, 
83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (2009); see also id. at 3 (citing the statement made by Prof. 
Zywicki before the Senate Judiciary Committee during the hearings preceding the 
approval of BAPCPA in 2005: “This bankruptcy ‘tax’ takes many forms.  It is 
obviously reflected in higher interest rates. . . .  It is [also] reflected in shorter grace 
periods for paying bills and higher penalty fees and late-charges for those who miss 
payments . . . [R]educing the number of strategic bankruptcies will reduce the 
bankruptcy tax paid by every American family . . . . These reforms will make the 
bankruptcy system more fair, equitable, and efficient, not only for bankruptcy debtors 
and creditors, but for all Americans.”).  For an argument against the conservative 
bankruptcy tradition, see SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 84 (“[I]f changes 
in the bankruptcy laws cause more debtors to discharge their debts, for instance, 
creditors will scrutinize their borrowers more carefully and either ration credit or charge 
higher interest rates.  This solution has downsides for creditors, of course.  Rationing 
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Furthermore, conservative scholars argue that the considerable 
increase in bankruptcy filings over the past three decades is due to the 
increased inclination of Americans to strategically use discharge as a 
financial planning tool,128 not because of a more fragile condition of the 
American middle class victimized by predatory lending techniques.129  
These proponents regard the ease of accessing consumer credit as a 
symptom of American prosperity rather than a source of over-
indebtedness and insolvency.  Therefore, progressive bankruptcy 
scholars should not focus on the supply side of consumer credit and 
instead, look elsewhere to understand why Americans file for 
bankruptcy so much more than in the past.130 
                                                                                                                                         
credit means making fewer loans.  And raising interest rates creates an adverse 
selection problem: the higher interest rates may drive low-risk borrowers out of the 
credit market, leaving a disproportionate percentage of high-risk borrowers. . . . [I]n 
either case, however, much of the cost will be passed on to borrowers.”). 
 128. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra Part IV.B. 
 130. See Zywicki, supra note 21, at 1474 (“This rapid increase in filings has been 
especially difficult to explain in light of the prosperous state of the American economy 
during most of the past two decades, and, especially, the extraordinary prosperity of the 
late 1990s.  Although the American economy set new records for economic growth, low 
unemployment, and low interest rates, this same period was also marked by record-high 
bankruptcy filings.  The Traditional model [i.e., the progressive approach] has tried to 
reconcile this anomaly of record-high prosperity matched with record-high bankruptcy 
filing rates by arguing that the economic prosperity of the past two decades is 
superficial and masks real underlying economic distress.  Proponents of the Traditional 
model thus do not question its fundamental validity; rather, they advocate digging 
deeper into the evidence to locate factual support for its continuing explanatory 
power.”).  According to the pro-creditor point of view, consumer credit availability, 
including subprime lending, functions to strengthen low-income households and does 
not favor their financial problems. Id. at 1487–88 (“For the majority of borrowers, 
therefore, the growth of the subprime market has enabled them to move from renting to 
buying housing, permitting them to build equity in their homes as a valuable asset to 
build wealth, rather than merely paying rent.  Moreover, homeownership is the best 
way for many low-income households to build wealth, as investments in stocks and 
bonds are not likely to be realistic options.  In fact, homeownership has been such a 
potent vehicle for wealth accumulation that the polarization of wealth between 
homeowners and renters has risen dramatically in recent years, even as the wealth 
polarization among different income classes has decreased.  For those who also use 
their homes for a home equity loan, this can be an attractive alternative to the poor 
credit options otherwise available to high-risk, low-income borrowers.  The expansion 
of the subprime lending market, therefore, has enabled low-income households to 
acquire an asset that has appreciated in value over the past decade, and thereby has 
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Having excluded lending techniques as a contributing factor to the 
financial distress of U.S. households, these scholars explain the rising 
tendency of the middle class to access discharge as a rational but 
abusive response to three major changes.  First, the Bankruptcy Code of 
1978 altered the cost-benefit analysis of discharge, which had become 
too favorable to debtors at a very moderate cost.131  Second, the radical 
change over the last three decades in social norms has reduced, if not 
annulled, the social stigma that traditionally accompanied discharge.132  
Third, lending techniques have become more impersonal in nature, 
undermining the trust between debtors and creditors that traditionally 
reduced the willingness of debtors to default.133 
D.  THE DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF DISCHARGE RECONSIDERED BASED ON 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 
The financial crisis of 2008 challenges and undermines the logical 
basis for the conservative position, according to which the ample 
availability of consumer credit increases the welfare of American 
households.134  This is because the crisis plainly illustrates the risks of 
taking on too much debt (due to the wide availability of consumer credit 
over the past two decades) and the ability of financial institutions to take 
advantage of the information asymmetries inherent to loan 
agreements.135  A significant percentage of Americans, thanks to the 
easy access to subprime lending, were able to buy a house and ended up 
                                                                                                                                         
enabled rapid wealth-building.  Thus, the data indicates that wealth has increased across 
the board (albeit at different rates), which suggests that the aggregate figures on 
household wealth are not disguising unrecognized hardship among some demographic 
groups.”). 
 131. See id. at 1527–32; Jones & Zywicki, supra note 104, at 209–15; David B. 
Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and 
Delinquency, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 319, 320 (2002); White, supra note 115, at 8–10. 
 132. On the historical evolution of social stigma related to bankruptcy, see Efrat, 
Bankruptcy Stigma, supra note 29, at 365–66; Zywicki, supra note 21, at 1532–34; 
Julie Kosterlitz, Over the Edge, 29 NAT’L J. 870, 871 (1997) (according to Alan 
Greenspan, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, “personal bankruptcies are 
soaring because Americans have lost their sense of shame”). 
 133. See Zywicki, supra note 21, at 1534–36; see also Buckley, supra note 123, at 
1085–86. 
 134. See supra Part IV.C. 
 135. For more on the financial crisis see generally Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. 
Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177 (2012). 
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being over-indebted, resulting in massive exposure to foreclosures.136  
Accordingly, with the benefit of hindsight, the progressive argument 
that the increase in consumer bankruptcy filings resulted from predatory 
lending techniques is more accurate.  It correctly observes that the over-
indebted American middle class, far from growing more prosperous due 
to consumer and subprime credit, becomes much more vulnerable to 
potential exogenous shocks.137 
Yet, while these scholars correctly anticipated the noxious effects 
of too much debt138 and identified consumer credit as the fundamental 
reason behind the filing explosion, they have neither fully accounted for 
the reasons behind consumers’ tendency toward over-indebtedness nor 
come up with any possible solutions.  By focusing on the need to make 
credit safer through stricter regulation of the supply side of the 
consumer credit industry,139 on the demand side, these scholars fail to go 
much further than merely defending discharge as the last remedy to 
protect debtors.140  Their neglect of the ex ante perspective overlooks the 
possibility that bankruptcy discharge shapes inefficient behavior on the 
part of debtors.141 
Therefore, in order to fully understand the reasons for consumers’ 
tendency to take on excessive debt, it is necessary to return to the ex 
ante perspective of pro-creditor scholars.  To truly grasp individual 
decision-making processes in this context, more sophisticated analytical 
tools are needed than the ones suggested by the homo economicus 
paradigm that normally lies at the foundation of law-and-economics 
bankruptcy discourse. 
In 1957, Herbert Simon coined the expression “bounded 
rationality” to indicate that actors often fail to satisfy the utility-
maximization assumption due to “heuristics,” which basically are 
mental shortcuts that people use to simplify decision-making.142  
                                                                                                                                         
 136. See Michele A. Dickerson, Over-Indebtedness, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 
and the Effect on U.S. Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 395, 400–05 (2009). 
 137. See supra Part IV.B. 
 138. See id.; SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 22–26. 
 139. For more on this perspective, see generally Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, 
Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 140. See supra Part IV.B. 
 141. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 142. See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 198, 270–71 
(1957); see also Russel B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
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Subsequent research in the behavioral sciences demonstrates that 
individuals are systematically biased when predicting the results of 
different events.143  Both heuristics and biases lead individuals to make 
decisions that contradict the “rational choice theory” or “expected utility 
theory,” according to which individuals rationally balance the benefits 
and costs of their actions in order to maximize their personal 
advantage.144 
Studies using principles of cognitive psychology to examine 
consumption habits show that over-indebtedness can be explained, at 
least to some degree, by bounded rationality because individuals do not 
always select the “right” amount of debt.145  In particular, individuals, 
such as debtors, tend to underestimate the risks of over-indebtedness and 
the likelihood of default, notwithstanding the statistics showing the high 
probability of default on certain types of loans (i.e., subprime loans).  
They tend to exclude the possibility that they could be exposed to an 
exogenous shock that would undermine their ability to fulfill their 
obligations.146  This underestimation of risk in general is called the 
                                                                                                                                         
Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
1051, 1075 (2000). 
 143. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choice, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. 
PSYCH. 341, 341 (1984). 
 144. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953), at 15–31. 
 145. Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: 
Rationality, Behavioralism and the Misguided Reform of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEXAS L. 
REV. 1481, 1489 (2006). 
 146. Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 6, at 1400 (“Underestimation of 
future borrowing may also result from an optimism bias that might lead consumers to 
underestimate the likelihood of contingencies bearing economic hardship.  Specifically, 
consumers might underestimate the likelihood of adverse events that might generate a 
need to borrow.  Optimistic individuals tend to underestimate the probability of being 
involved in an accident that might generate high medical bills or other liquidity needs.  
Similarly, individuals tend to underestimate the probability that either they or a loved 
one will become ill and require costly treatment (that is not covered, or not entirely 
covered, by their insurance plan).  Finally, individuals tend to underestimate the 
likelihood that they will lose their job or underestimate the length of time it will take 
them to find a new job.  These and other manifestations of the optimism bias will lead 
consumers to underestimate the likelihood that they will be forced to resort to credit 
card borrowing.”); Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime 
Mortgage Contracts, supra note 6, at 1079 (“Optimistic borrowers underestimate the 
future cost of the deferred-cost contract.  They overestimate their future income.  They 
expect to have unrealistically attractive refinance options.  Or, they overestimate the 
expected value of a bet placed on the real estate market, perhaps because they 
irrationally expect that a 10 percent price increase last year will be replicated next year.  
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“optimism bias.”147  Because of this cognitive distortion, debtors 
underestimate the costs of borrowing and perform an inaccurate cost-
benefit analysis when shopping for loans.148 
Other biases also help explain why consumers make harmful 
financial decisions.  For example, the use of credit cards diminishes the 
sensation of loss that consumers experience when they pay in cash, 
contributing to a phenomenon that cognitive psychologists define as 
“bounded willpower.”149  This concept explains why small credit card 
transactions can accumulate into a conspicuous debt that would not have 
been assumed in a single transaction.150  “Hyperbolic discount,” the 
preference for immediate gratification over future gains, is also 
considered to plausibly explain consumers’ tendency to take on 
                                                                                                                                         
If myopic and optimistic borrowers focus on the short term and discount the long term, 
then lenders will offer deferred-cost contracts with low short-term prices and high long-
term prices.”); see also Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory 
Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725, 735–37 (2005); Baird, supra note 100, at 18; Jackson, 
supra note 36, at 1411–12; Ramsay, ‘Wannabe WAGS’ and Credit ‘Binges’, supra note 
6, at 85. 
 147. See Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 
252 (2006).  Cognitive psychology studies have demonstrated multiple situations where 
individuals are affected by the optimism bias.  For example, it is common among 
smokers to believe that they will be able to quit smoking in the future. See Paul Slovic, 
What Does It Mean to Know a Cumulative Risk? Adolescents’ Perceptions of Short-
Term and Long-Term Consequences of Smoking, 13 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 259, 261 
(2000).  Similarly, recently married couples deny the possibility that their relationship 
will end in a divorce, disregarding statistics showing a high rate of divorce. See Bruno 
S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, Marriage Paradoxes, 8 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 
187, 196 (1996). 
 148. See Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 6, at 1378 (“The underestimation 
bias that underlies the identified welfare costs also qualifies the no-intervention 
presumption of the freedom-of-contract paradigm. If a contracting party misconceives 
the future consequences of the contract, then the normative power of contractual 
consent is significantly weakened.”). 
 149. See George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, “We Can Do This the Easy Way 
or the Hard Way:” Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 183, 196 (2006). 
 150. See Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 6, at 1399 (“Imperfect self-
control leading to the underestimation of future borrowing has been traced back to the 
temporal separation between the decision to obtain a credit card and the decision to 
borrow on the credit card.  But, in fact, there is not one, but rather many borrowing 
decisions.  Each time the consumer swipes her card, a new loan is entered into.  This 
piecemeal borrowing phenomenon, or ‘a-little-at-a-time borrowing,’ exacerbates the 
self-control problem.”); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 130. 
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excessive debt.151  The concept explains that borrowers overestimate the 
benefit of an immediate loan while underestimating the cost of future 
interest.152 
Lastly, the way that borrowers evaluate gains and losses depends 
on how a certain choice (i.e., taking out a mortgage loan) is framed.153  
“Framing” is a cognitive bias whereby  
two different statements of a choice are logically equivalent but not 
transparently equivalent.  Normally consumers are not conscious of 
alternate ways of framing decisions or of the psychological effects of 
different frames.  Thus, how a decision is framed can manipulate and 
momentarily shift the order of a homeowner’s preferences.  Framing 
is the alchemy that permits predatory lenders to manipulate the order 
of homeowners’ preferences and overcome their otherwise strong 
aversion to losing their homes.154 
This behavioral law-and-economics analysis elucidates that 
excessive debt is not necessarily the outcome of individual rational 
choices or a symptom of American middle-class prosperity, as argued 
                                                                                                                                         
 151. See Drazen Prelec & George Loewenstein, The Red and the Black: Mental 
Accounting of Savings and Debt, 17 MARKETING SCI. 15 (1998); see also Bar-Gill, 
Seduction by Plastic, supra note 6, at 1396 (“A consumer is said to be a hyperbolic 
discounter if her short-run discount rate is larger than her long-run discount rate . . . 
When a hyperbolic discounter is naïve about the nature of her time preferences, she will 
overestimate her will-power, and consequently underestimate her future borrowing.”); 
Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, supra 
note 6, at 1119.  But see Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and 
Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 131 (2006) (offering an argument in 
defense of the economic rationale for teaser rates: “So what is wrong with teaser rates 
anyhow? Go into any bakery and there are free samples that are intended to entice 
customers into purchases.  The baker gets a new product to customers who might not 
buy the full package taste unknown.  Wine is sold the same way.  So it is with lending 
agreements.  Try this bank out to see whether you like their customer service, their 
monthly payments, their promotional devices.  There is an easy informational 
explanation that does not require an appeal to hyperbolic discount rates.  Indeed, if that 
were the explanation, then we should expect frantic customers in search of short-term 
gains to grab the next teaser rate that comes along when the first expires.  But most 
customers keep a bank because they like the relationship even when the low rate 
expires.  Banning these rates will do no good, and it could easily work some 
anticompetitive harm, by making it more difficult for new banks to pry customers away 
from established competitors.”). 
 152. Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 6, at 1396. 
 153. McCoy, supra note 146, at 731–32. 
 154. See id. 
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by conservative bankruptcy scholars.155  Rather, over-indebtedness is 
better explained as the consequence of faulty decision-making processes 
that are vulnerable to a pandemic of consumer credit and predatory 
lending techniques.156 
The aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has shown that financial 
institutions ably exploited the aforementioned information asymmetries 
by shaping offers of credit based on borrowers’ cognitive mistakes and 
aggressively marketing loans that would give prominence to immediate 
benefits and obscure long-term costs.157  This contradicts the traditional 
law-and-economics analysis, according to which the increase in 
consumer bankruptcy procedures would have led to the rationing of 
credit by financial institutions,158 because the financial industry—
particularly in the past twenty years—had expanded offers of credit by 
using subprime loans to reach out to all types of borrowers, including 
those in financial straits and delinquent debtors desperate to refinance 
                                                                                                                                         
 155. See supra Part IV.C. 
 156. The explosion of consumer credit, and consequent excessive level of household 
debt that followed, occurred in the U.K. in similar fashion to the United States.  
Between 2001 and 2005, the newspaper The Guardian published more than 50 pieces 
covering the “unsuitable borrowing binge.”  On the U.K. “debt culture,” also described 
as “live now pay later culture,” see Ramsay, ‘Wannabe WAGS’ and Credit ‘Binges’, 
supra note 6, at 75–76, 82.  A similar tendency has characterized the Brazilian economy 
over the past few years, where the high reliance on consumer credit has been described 
as a “credit hangover.” See Lima-Marques & Benjamin, supra note 6, at 60–61. On the 
relationship between the increase of consumer credit and the increase in consumer 
bankruptcy filings, see generally Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit 
Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249 (1997); David A. Moss & Gibbs 
A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both?, 73 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 311 (1999). 
 157. See Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 6, at 1376 (“The underestimation 
bias can explain the unique pricing patterns in the credit card market.  If consumers 
underestimate their future borrowing, issuers can be expected to raise the long-term, 
borrowing-contingent elements of the credit card price.  Thus, interest rates as well as 
late and over-limit fees are set above marginal cost, since consumers are insufficiently 
sensitive to variation in these long-term elements of the credit card price.  On the other 
hand, competition in the credit card market forces issuers to compensate for these high, 
long-term prices by under-pricing the short-term, non-contingent elements of the credit 
card contract, which are not subject to the underestimation bias.  To attract consumers, 
issuers must resort to below-marginal-cost (and even negative) prices in setting annual 
and per-transaction fees as well as introductory, short-term interest rates (teaser 
rates).”); see also Sunstein, supra note 147, at 267–68. 
 158. See supra Part IV.C. 
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their previous obligations.  The increase in bankruptcy filings did not 
result in the rationing of credit because creditors anticipated the rate of 
default and therefore, passed the cost of discharge onto solvent debtors 
through higher interest.159  It appears, then, that the 2005 BAPCPA 
reform of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 that financial institutions so 
fiercely pursued was indeed not aimed at limiting access to bankruptcy 
discharge, but rather at delaying proceedings to force debtors into 
remaining in the “sweat box” longer, thereby increasing lenders’ 
profits.160 
V.  A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE 
A. RESTORING THE ORIGINAL FOUNDATION OF COMMON LAW 
BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE 
The behavioral law-and-economics analysis provides a much more 
realistic picture of the consumer credit market than the traditional 
economics approach.  Over-indebtedness is persuasively explained in 
terms of the cognitive mistakes that affect the demand side of the 
consumer credit market, particularly borrowers’ tendency to 
underestimate the expected costs of a loan that results in unreasonably 
risky financial decisions.  It is also explained by the supply side’s ability 
to exploit the information asymmetries pertaining to loan agreements and 
then pass the costs of bankruptcy discharge onto society, particularly 
financially sound debtors. 
This Part focuses on the demand side of the consumer credit market 
and aims to show, from a normative perspective, how to shape 
bankruptcy discharge policy in order to correct borrowers’ cognitive 
mistakes.161  In particular, this Part challenges the view of progressive 
                                                                                                                                         
 159. See SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 190 (“When individual debtors 
file for bankruptcy, much of what they discharge is consumer credit, since these 
obligations are generally unsecured and thus unprotected.  This does not mean that 
credit card companies and other consumer creditors lose more and more money as the 
number of bankruptcy filings increases, of course.  So long as consumer creditors can 
anticipate their losses, they can pass much of the cost on to future borrowers by raising 
interest rates or restricting access to credit.  The cost of these adjustments falls on future 
debtors, not the consumer creditors.”). 
 160. On the real scope of BAPCPA, as alleged by progressive bankruptcy scholars, 
see supra Part III.B. 
 161. As shown above, progressive bankruptcy scholars have traditionally neglected 
to consider the incentives that bankruptcy discharge poses to borrowers, focusing on the 
opportunity for stricter regulation of the supply side of the consumer credit market. See 
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scholars that discharge should be accessible to any over-indebted 
individual regardless of the reasons for the debt162 because this ex post 
perspective fails to consider the contribution of discharge to the 
structure of incentives that, ex ante, influence borrowers’ decision-
making processes and eventually their financial decisions.163  This 
paradigm seems to have overlooked the consequences, on borrowers’ 
incentives, of the dramatic twentieth-century shift in the rationale for 
discharge, which stopped being the last resort for the honest but 
unfortunate debtor and became a safe harbor for any debtor in financial 
distress.164 
                                                                                                                                         
supra Part IV.B.  In particular, these scholars have suggested correcting information 
asymmetries through information-based mandatory provisions. See id.  It has been 
argued that by making the potential consequences of over-indebtedness more apparent, 
borrowers would spontaneously correct their optimism bias. See Bar-Gill, Seduction by 
Plastic, supra note 6, at 1420 (“Information-based intervention has been proven 
feasible and effective in other contexts.  Mandatory warnings on cigarette or drug 
packaging are a prominent example.  The success of the anti-smoking and anti-drug 
advertisement campaigns is also suggestive.  Perhaps the modern tendency to finance 
consumption with debt, without a complete understanding of the future repercussions of 
such a tendency, can be (at least partially) overcome through the provision of 
information.”).  Information-based regulation could certainly prove to be useful but at 
the same time insufficient to cure cognitive mistakes.  As shown by scholars using 
behavioral law-and-economics methodology, information provided to consumers may 
prove ineffective when consumers, affected by the optimism bias, disregard the 
likelihood of being exposed to a negative event (e.g., defaulting on loan payments).  
Therefore, the way that information is provided (e.g., framing consequences in terms of 
losses rather than gain in order to exploit borrowers’ loss aversion) is fundamental to 
the effectiveness of information-based regulations.  See Lauren E. Willis, Against 
Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 203 (2008); Lauren E. Willis, 
Evidence and Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of Financial Education, 46 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 415 (2009); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1536–37 (1998); 
BLOCK-LIEB ET AL., supra note 19, at 154, 171; Sunstein, supra note 147, at 260–61. 
 162. See supra Part III.A. and notes 99–100. 
 163. On the contrary, traditional law-and-economics analysis should take credit for 
adopting an ex ante perspective and taking into consideration the “institutions that 
provide the incentives and constraints on filing bankruptcy.” Zywicki, supra note 21, at 
1526, n.236.  If law-and-economics scholars are correct in adopting an ex ante 
perspective, they fall short in recognizing evidence of borrowers’ cognitive mistakes, 
and proven wrong in arguing that consumers opportunistically use bankruptcy 
discharge as a tool to plan their finances. See supra Part IV.C. 
 164. See supra Part III.A. 
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The term “unfortunate,” traditionally tied to the idea of an 
exogenous shock (i.e., merchant misfortunes at sea, job loss, medical 
problems, or divorce), gradually became synonymous in U.S. 
bankruptcy law with “over-indebted.”  The long-established legal 
principle that holds individuals liable for negligent behavior (i.e., 
prodigality or extravagance) while still deserving relief in the case of an 
“act of God” (i.e., the loss of a ship in a tempest) was abandoned with 
little challenge during the twentieth century.165  The resulting prospect of 
automatic discharge, independent of a judiciary or administrative filter 
that would assess a borrower’s negligence,166 translates into a direct fall 
in borrowing costs, which multiplies any existing optimism bias, 
bounded willpower, and hyperbolic discount.167  The possibility of 
bearing no liability for assuming too much debt, while not necessarily 
translating into opportunistic and hazardous behaviors as conservative 
scholars would argue,168 might influence borrowers’ decision-making 
processes and lead to excessive debt.169 
                                                                                                                                         
 165. See supra Part II.A, and note 41 and accompanying text.  On the failure to 
notice how the structure of bankruptcy discharge can change borrowers’ incentives, see 
supra note 125 and accompanying text. See also Hallinan, supra note 70, at 65 (“As the 
‘typical’ bankrupt thus shifted from merchant to wage earner, the rationale of the 
discharge as an entrepreneurial incentive tended to lose its force and the incentive 
structure established under that rationale became increasingly problematic.  Yet, while 
there was certainly no shortage of commentary directed to the apparent mismatch 
between law and policy, the basic legal structure and most of the details of the ‘fresh 
start’ remained unchanged until the years shortly before the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code in 1978.”). 
 166. “U.S. and English bankruptcy law went very separate ways during the course 
of the nineteenth century.  English lawmakers adopted a heavily administrative system, 
which positions an official receiver between debtors and the possibility of a discharge. 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, by contrast, left much of the U.S. process to the parties 
themselves.” SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 21, at 90; see also Douglas, supra 
note 112, at 332–33. 
 167. As discussed, individuals underestimate the costs of borrowing since they are 
affected by different cognitive mistakes, which undermine their ability to correctly 
assess the risks hidden behind a financial decision. See supra Part IV.D. 
 168. See supra Part IV.C. 
 169. It is a well understood principle of law-and-economics that when the default 
rule is “no liability,” individuals tend not to exercise any care, for doing so would entail 
costs without producing any benefit to them.  Furthermore, in the absence of liability, 
economic analysis of law has shown that individuals engage in a certain activity (e.g., 
borrowing money) to too great an extent since they do not have to subtract costs from 
the utility deriving from the activity. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 179,195 (2004). 
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Progressive scholars seem to have disregarded the possibility that 
the very same institution of bankruptcy discharge that they perceive as a 
fundamental safety net for the American lower-middle class may 
translate, when shaped in a very liberal fashion, into a powerful stimulus 
for cognitive mistakes that ultimately cause over-indebtedness.  
Extending automatic discharge to any over-indebted could eventually 
impair the very same individuals that discharge intends to protect while 
spurring the profitability of the financial industry. 
This profound split between the original rationale behind 
bankruptcy discharge (protecting the honest but unfortunate debtor) and 
its modern version (protecting any over-indebted individual) seems 
justified only if the mistakes of borrowers cannot be cured or 
corrected170 because only then would it make sense to treat the rationally 
bounded debtor as an unfortunate person whose over-indebtedness was 
not due to negligence.171  A large contingent of bankruptcy scholars has 
embraced this latter approach: 
Blackstone did not understand that the bankruptcy discharge is a way 
of protecting individuals from themselves: it effectively shields them 
from consequences of the choice they make.  Over time, the 
bankruptcy discharge has evolved away from the assumption that 
individuals act completely rationally.  We no longer must show that 
our troubles arose because of something other than our own bad 
decisions.  We no longer have to be both honest and unfortunate to 
obtain a fresh start.172 
Essentially, U.S. bankruptcy law seems to embrace the strongly 
paternalistic view that discharge must apply indiscriminately to any 
over-indebted borrower for the simple reason that individuals must be 
protected from themselves.  This, in turn, brings paradoxical legal 
consequences.  For example, from the moment individuals enter into a 
loan agreement, they are treated as legally and mentally capable.  
Therefore, the contract is considered valid.  Nonetheless, when the 
accrued level of debt becomes excessive, the same individual that was 
treated as legally capable is then considered to be a rationally bounded 
                                                                                                                                         
 170. According to Hallinan, cognitive biases “are not particularly amenable to 
correction, whether by training, education, or even experience.” Supra note 70, at 134. 
 171. See id. at 127. 
 172. Baird, supra note 100, at 24–25.  These words are in stark contrast to the words 
delivered by an English judge in 1810. See Brown’s Case, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 158, 159–60 
(La. 1810); see also supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
2014] THE PARADOXICAL BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE 335 
victim of that individual’s own faulty decision-making process, thereby 
excusing that individual from any consequences related to the valid loan 
agreement. 
The paradoxical nature of this progressive policy becomes even 
more pronounced when one accepts that such liberal access to automatic 
discharge intensifies borrowers’ cognitive mistakes, deepening the very 
same problem of over-indebtedness that discharge is intended to cure.  
These limitations show the failure to consider the difference between 
individuals affected by bounded rationality and those who lack the legal 
and mental capacity to enter into a valid contract (i.e., minors or the 
mentally ill).  The former group is able to learn from their cognitive 
mistakes while the latter, as a matter of law, is not. 
On a hypothetical spectrum with the strong, paternalistic approach 
of expansive discharge on one end and the strong, libertarian one that 
entirely denies access to discharge and holds debtors fully liable for 
their actions on the other, it is possible to envision, somewhere in the 
middle, sound legal prescriptions that are able to protect deserving over-
indebted individuals without making discharge a further incentive for 
irresponsible behavior.173  To inhibit the natural human tendency toward 
over-indebtedness—in other words, to induce borrowers to take on an 
efficient level of debt—the costs of borrowing must be made more 
visible so that individuals consider those costs when making decisions.  
While imposing mandatory, supply-side regulation to increase 
transparency174 may partly achieve this goal, discharge should be shaped 
to make borrowers (the demand side) more careful in their financial 
decisions. 
In order to correct cognitive mistakes, it seems fundamental that 
individuals are aware that they will be held liable for their activity or to 
put it differently, that they internalize the costs of borrowing, knowing 
                                                                                                                                         
 173. In the past decade, many scholars have written about the possibility of framing 
regulation that is able to correct cognitive mistakes, and steer people’s choices in 
directions that will improve their welfare without jeopardizing their freedom.  On this 
line of reasoning, see Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is 
Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161–62 (2003); Colin Camerer et al., 
Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric 
Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2003).  For a recent skeptical position on 
“libertarian paternalism,” see Lauren E. Willis, When Nudge Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1157–58 (2013). 
 174. This is the prescription commonly suggested by progressive bankruptcy 
scholars. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 139, at 157; Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 
supra note 6, at 1419–20. 
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that their cognitive mistakes will not be forgiven.  Despite the largely 
failed attempts to train people through financial education programs to 
“debias” their decision-making,175 denying discharge where the over-
indebtedness resulted from negligence may vividly and effectively 
remind borrowers of the need to account for all costs and possible 
consequences deriving from their financial decisions. 
Restoring the original foundation of bankruptcy discharge (the 
protection of the honest but unfortunate debtor) by reinstating personal 
liability (the equivalent of civil law’s universal patrimonial liability)176 
for over-indebtedness resulting from negligence and not an exogenous 
shock would set the right balance between protecting fragile borrowers 
and creating a structure of incentives that would induce borrowers make 
more prudent financial choices.177 
B. BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE AS A REMEDY FOR THE UNFORTUNATE 
DEBTOR:  INSIGHTS FROM EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 
An analysis of the prescriptions for bankruptcy discharge that some 
European legal systems have adopted offers important corroborative 
evidence for the ex ante perspective that this Article suggests. 
                                                                                                                                         
 175. See Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 
429, 430 (2011). 
 176. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.B. 
 177. For an effective illustration of how the possibility of incurring negative 
consequences makes individuals more aware of the costs of their actions, see IAN 
AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET THINGS 
DONE passim (2010); see also Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci, The Rise of 
Carrots and the Decline of Sticks, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 341 (2013).  The need to make 
bankruptcy discharge a non-automatic process has been stressed by the founder of the 
progressive bankruptcy school: William O. Douglas.  Yet, his own disciples, who 
considered it “un-American,” disregarded his proposal. See Skeel, Progressive 
Bankruptcy Scholarship, supra note 24, at 1110, 1085 (“Douglas strongly believed that 
many debtors could avoid financial distress if they were encouraged to manage their 
affairs more carefully.  Several of Douglas’s proposals sought, in overtly instrumental 
fashion, to shape future debtors’ behavior. . . . Douglas, like many legal realists, was a 
fervent advocate of judicial and administrative discretion.  In his discussion of 
speculation and gambling, for instance, Douglas insisted: ‘[An] attempt to treat all cases 
of speculation and gambling categorically would be absurd.  It would seem desirable, 
however, to provide administrators with discretionary power so as to take cognizance of 
the variants among the cases.’”). 
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1.  England 
It is worth mentioning English bankruptcy law first, which until the 
nineteenth century, has inspired the evolution of U.S. bankruptcy law.178  
In 2007, the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act introduced the 
“Debt Relief Order” procedure, which applies to debtors who have few 
or no assets.179  According to Schedule 4A[2 (2) of the Insolvency Act, 
the official receiver (a role similar to the one discharged in the United 
States by the Bankruptcy Trustee) can ask the court to issue a 
Bankruptcy Restriction Order, which effectively imposes upon the 
debtor, for anywhere from two to fifteen years,180 the same restrictions 
normally applied during the twelve-month bankruptcy period.181  The 
receiver may request this if the receiver considers the debtor to have 
acted in one of the following ways: 
(g) trading at a time before commencement of the bankruptcy when 
the bankrupt knew or ought to have known that he was himself to be 
unable to pay his debts; (h) incurring, before commencement of the 
bankruptcy, a debt which the bankrupt had no reasonable expectation 
of being able to pay; (j) carrying on any gambling, rash and 
hazardous speculation or unreasonable extravagance which may 
have materially contributed to or increased the extent of the 
bankruptcy or which took place between presentation of the petition 
and commencement of the bankruptcy.182 
Even if the Bankruptcy Restriction Order does not prevent 
discharge, it is important to observe that English bankruptcy law 
distinguishes not only between the honest, unfortunate debtor and the 
fraudulent debtor but also between the former and the 
negligent/reckless, over-optimistic debtor who took on debt that he had 
no reasonable expectation of repaying.183  The Order applies not only 
when the debtor acted opportunistically but also when he “ought to have 
                                                                                                                                         
 178. See supra  Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2. 
 179. See Insolvency Act of 1986, c. 45, sch. 4A, § 4(2) (Eng.) modified by the 
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act of 2007. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Such restrictions include the inability to assume new debts or carry on business 
(directly or indirectly) in a different name from the one used while becoming bankrupt. 
See id. § 360. 
 182. See Schedule 4A[2 (2) Insolvency Act 1986 as amended by the Tribunals, 
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. 
 183. Adrian Walters, Personal Insolvency Law After the Enterprise Act: An 
Appraisal, 5 J. CORP. L. STUD. 65 (2005). 
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known that he was himself to be unable to pay his debts,” meaning that 
he will suffer the consequences of his cognitive errors that resulted in 
financial bad decisions. 
2. Denmark and Sweden 
Scandinavian legal systems are other examples of bankruptcy 
prescriptions based on an ex ante perspective.  Danish bankruptcy law, 
as amended in 2005, provides that in order to grant the discharge to an 
over-indebted consumer, the court must carefully consider the causes 
behind the over-indebtedness.184  Furthermore, the court must deny the 
debtor’s proposed debt adjustment plan and therefore the debtor’s ability 
to obtain discharge, upon a finding that the debtor behaved in a 
financially irresponsible way.  The denial of discharge must be made in 
cases where a considerable debt was incurred when the debtor (1) was 
unable to meet the financial obligations, or (2) undertook a financial risk 
disproportionate to the debtor’s financial situation.185  Accordingly, 
Danish bankruptcy law not only denies discharge in cases of fraudulent 
or opportunistic behaviour, but also when an over-optimistic consumer 
acting in good faith took on a disproportionate amount of debt. 
Swedish law follows the Danish logic, requiring that an 
independent administrative agency assess the reasonableness of the debt 
adjustment plan.  In 2006, the Swedish Supreme Court stated that the 
administrative agency must deny access to a debt adjustment plan when 
the over-indebtedness resulted from speculative behavior and the 
consumer undertook a disproportionate risk.186 
The Scandinavian ex ante approach aims at preventing the option of 
bankruptcy discharge from supplying a reason to underestimate the cost 
of debt and make unreasonably risky decisions.187 
                                                                                                                                         
 184. See DANISH BANKRUPTCY LAW Konkurslov (Part IV, Gaeldssanering § 197, 
paragraph 2). 
 185. See id. 
 186. Jason J. Kilborn, Out With the New, In With the Old: As Sweden Aggressively 
Streamlines Its Consumer Bankruptcy System, Have U.S. Reformers Fallen Off the 
Learning Curve?, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435 (2007). 
 187. See supra Part IV.D. 
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3. Italy 
The Italian legal system recently followed this Scandinavian 
approach by introducing its first consumer bankruptcy law at the end of 
2012.188  Pursuant to Article 12-bis, paragraph 3 of Italian Law No. 
3/2012, the court must deny access to the debt adjustment plan proposed 
by the consumer upon a finding that the debt was incurred without a 
reasonable prospect of repayment.  The court must also reject the 
proposal if it finds that the debtor disproportionately relied on consumer 
credit, and therefore negligently incurred over-indebtedness.189 
The Court, after having verified that the debt adjustment is feasible . 
. . , approves the plan when it excludes that the consumer has 
undertaken obligations without having a reasonable possibility to 
discharge them or has negligently caused his over-indebtedness, also 
through relying on credit that was not proportional to his patrimonial 
capacity . . . . 
4. Comparing the Bankruptcy Laws of Denmark, Sweden, and Italy to 
the United States 
Unlike U.S. bankruptcy law, which allows discharge for any over-
indebted person,190 the Scandinavian and Italian developments 
effectively restore the original foundation of discharge.191  In the latter 
legal systems, the paradigmatic “honest but unfortunate” debtor who 
took on a sustainable level of debt that later turned into pathological 
debt due to an independent, exogenous shock is back at the center of the 
bankruptcy procedure.  The deep split between these European 
prescriptions and contemporary American bankruptcy law is 
immediately apparent when one juxtaposes the former with the words of 
                                                                                                                                         
 188. See Law No. 3 of January 27, 2012, which was later amended by Law Decree 
No. 179 of October 18, 2012 (also amended by Law No. 221 of December 17, 2012). 
 189. Article 12-bis, paragraph 3, Law No. 3/2012: “Verificata la fattibilità del piano 
e l’idoneità dello stesso ad assicurare il pagamento dei crediti impignorabili, nonché dei 
crediti di cui all’articolo 7, comma 1, terzo periodo, e risolta ogni altra contestazione 
anche in ordine all’effettivo ammontare dei crediti, il giudice, quando esclude che il 
consumatore ha assunto obbligazioni senza la ragionevole prospettiva di poterle 
adempiere ovvero che ha colposamente determinato il sovraindebitamento, anche per 
mezzo di un ricorso al credito non proporzionato alle proprie capacità patrimoniali, 
omologa il piano, disponendo per il relativo provvedimento una forma idonea di 
pubblicità.” 
 190. See supra Part III. 
 191. See supra Part II.A. 
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Douglas Baird: “we no longer must show that our troubles arose because 
of something other than our own bad decisions.  We no longer have to 
be both honest and unfortunate to obtain a fresh start.”192  The ex ante 
perspective of some European countries aims at avoiding the fraudulent 
and opportunistic behaviors that are the main concern of law-and-
economics scholars193 as well as the exacerbation of consumers’ 
irrational tendency toward over-indebtedness. 
The notion that an individual must prove misfortune or the absence 
of negligence in order to benefit from discharge does not reflect any 
punitive agenda toward the reckless debtor.  Instead, making the costs of 
borrowing more visible would create the right incentives for individuals 
to correct cognitive mistakes.194  Once discharge is exclusively granted 
to the unfortunate debtor, this legal device would cease to exacerbate the 
problem of over-indebtedness and would reinstate its function as social 
insurance, whereby only specific risk and not mere financial distress is 
protected.  Once bankruptcy discharge is understood as social insurance, 
a “private” safety net aimed at protecting honest but “unfortunate” 
individuals, it could be argued that the scope of this measure should be 
graduated according to the extent of the functionally alternative, 
“public” social welfare policies.  Following this line of reasoning, it 
would be reasonable to argue that since the scope of the welfare state in 
Europe—notwithstanding the current austerity measures—is still 
significant, discharge should be limited to confined cases, whereas in the 
United States, in light of its limited welfare state, discharge might be 
applied more broadly.195 
CONCLUSION 
The reasoning that this Article advances on the problem of 
consumer bankruptcy, which is also supported by recent trends in some 
European legal systems, reveals the limits of both sides of the highly 
ideological debate that characterizes U.S. bankruptcy scholarship.  The 
conservative position relies upon an unrealistic law-and-economics 
analysis in supporting the BAPCPA reform, which was not intended to 
limit bankruptcy discharge, but rather to enhance financial industry 
                                                                                                                                         
 192. See Baird, supra note 100, at 25.  
 193. See supra Part IV.C. 
 194. See supra Part IV.D. 
 195. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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profits.  Meanwhile, at the other extreme, progressive scholars entirely 
neglect to account for the maladaptive incentives that discharge creates 
for borrowers. 
The first paradox that this study unveils is that the very same 
remedy that pro-debtor scholars intensely defend as an essential safety 
net for the American lower-middle class is also a powerful incentive for 
over-indebtedness, and therefore a means of profit for lenders when that 
policy is shaped in overly liberal terms.  The 2008 financial crisis 
illustrates the perils of too much debt and how individuals tend to 
underestimate those perils.  To truly protect borrowers, these credit 
market failures must be addressed by both more strictly regulating the 
supply side of credit and reshaping discharge to encourage borrowers to 
correct their cognitive mistakes. 
This Article also reconsiders the conventional wisdom that assigns 
a pro-creditor connotation to the civil law tradition, founded on the 
principle of debtors’ universal patrimonial liability, while labeling as 
pro-debtor the common law tradition, which characterizes for a liberal 
regime of bankruptcy discharge. 
A second paradox emerges when observing discharge through the 
lens of behavioral law and economics.  The tendency toward over-
indebtedness and the consequential vulnerability of borrowers and 
prosperity of the financial industry are much more pronounced in 
common law regimes, where debtors are considered to be more strongly 
protected.  On the other hand, the civil law systems, which have 
historically adopted a less debtor-friendly approach to discharge, and are 
therefore conventionally considered more favorable to creditors, are 
characterized by more sound, financially solid borrowing practices and a 
less expansive supply of consumer credit, both of which help to insulate 
consumers from potentially disastrous debt. 
Based on these conclusions, this Article argues that U.S. 
bankruptcy law should be revised to only protect the honest, unfortunate 
debtor similar to the bankruptcy laws in England, Denmark, Sweden, 
and Italy.  This would help to correct biases and heuristics, which would 
discourage over-indebtedness. 
